

CONFERENCE REPORT: “NATO IN THE RUN-UP TO ISTANBUL” (EATA)
COMPILED BY MATTHEW FRIAR ON BEHALF OF THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL
OF FINLAND (ACF)



Eesti NATO Ühing
ESTONIAN ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION

**Program of the 2nd International Conference of
Estonian Atlantic Treaty Association
“NATO in the run-up to Istanbul”
on the occasion of Estonia’s full membership in NATO
3rd -5th June 2004, Tallinn, Estonia**

Conference Program:

Thursday, 3rd June	Arrival
	Settle-in (Reval Hotel Olümpia)
19.00	Reception (Reval Hotel Olümpia, 14 th floor)
Friday, 4th June	Conference in Reval Hotel Olümpia, Liivalaia 33, Tallinn
8.00	Registration and morning coffee
8.30	Welcoming by Amb. Kalev Stoicescu , EATA Chairman; Greetings and opening speech, Mr. Sven Mikser , Chairman of Defense Committee of Parliament, former Defense Minister, Estonia
9.00	Panel I: “The Role of Public Diplomacy in NATO”
Moderator	Mr. Marko Mihkelson , Chairman, FAC of Parliament, Estonia
Keynote speech	Mr. Jean Fournet , Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy, NATO
9.20	Mr. Troels Fröling , Secretary General, Atlantic Treaty Association
9.35	“The New Tasks of Public Diplomacy” Dr. Lidija _ehuli_ , Deputy President, Atlantic Council and Centre for International Studies, Croatia
9.50	Open discussion (Q&A)
10.30	Coffee break
10.45	Panel II: “The Baltic Sea Area – A Perspective Model of Regional Cooperation, Security and Stability”
Moderator	Dr. Tomas Ries , Senior Researcher, National Defense College, Finland
Keynote speech	Amb. Toomas Hendrik Ilves , MEP, former Foreign Minister, Estonia

11.05	“Future Baltic Co-operation in the Security Fields” Brig. Gen. Michael Clemmesen , Commandant, Baltic Defense College
11.20	“A Regional Club within an Enlarged Union” Mr. Carl-Einar Stålvant , National Defense College, Sweden
11.35	“Europe of Regional Clubs: A Russian Perspective” Mr. Timofei Bordachev , Director of Studies of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, Deputy editor of the magazine <i>Russia in Global Affairs</i>
11.50	Mr. Ulrik Kragh , Deputy Chairman, Committee of Defense, Denmark
12.05	Open discussion
13.00	Lunch
14.30	Panel III: “New Risks, New Threats, New Approaches to Security”
Moderator	Mr. Boris Kuznetsov , Director, Center for Integration Research & Projects (CIRP), St. Petersburg, Russia
Keynote speech	Mrs. Kristiina Ojuland , Foreign Minister, Estonia; Brief discussion period
14.50	“Globalization, the Liberal Imperative, Islamism and the Future of Conflict in the 21 st Century” Prof. Dr. Michael Mihalka , East European Studies, College of International and Security Studies, Marshall Center
15.05	“Challenges of Security Policy in the 21 st Century: New Threats Arise, Old Threats Remain” Dr. Gabor Brodi , Assistant State Secretary of Foreign Ministry, former Ambassador to OSCE, Hungary
15.20	“The War on Terrorism and NATO” Prof. Dr. Anton Bebler , President, Atlantic Council, Slovenia
15.35	“NATO-EU Security Cooperation” Dr. Giovanni Gasparini , Research Fellow, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Italy
15.50	“CIMIC Operations and Experiences from Afghanistan” Col. Ole Martin Hojem , Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Military Cooperation, NATO Rapid Deployable Corps
16.05	Open discussion
17.00	Concluding remarks
17.15	Glass of wine
Saturday, 5th June	Sight-seeing tour and departure
12.00	Sight-seeing of Tallinn

Note* - Because only one hard-copy conference paper was presented during the conference, the information provided below is based almost solely on notes taken throughout the day (June 4). Therefore - although I have tried my best - the chance that I have conveyed all speakers' arguments, opinions or other points of information flawlessly is very improbable. Please do not regard any of the material below as verbatim from any panelists' speech and do not quote it as so either.

Where necessary, I have provided footnotes defining essential terms and/or concepts. All definitions are taken out of NATO's recent publication *NATO Transformed (2004)*, which was available at the conference, or from NATO's website (www.nato.int). Definitions are meant only to clarify a term or explain an acronym – such as “ISAF” – and not to elaborate on a panelist's opinion or add an element to the discussion that was not present during the conference period.

Friday, 4th June

8.30

Welcoming by **Amb. Kalev Stoicescu**, EATA Chairman

The speaker noted with enthusiasm that the accession of seven new members to NATO – Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia – undeniably changes the security map of Europe in a way such that overall security has been increased in a way that is greater relative to the size of the new member countries and their armies. The speaker highlighted that the Estonian Atlantic Treaty Association (EATA) fully supports transatlantic cooperation and the membership of Estonia in NATO. The speaker concluded by presenting the agenda for the day.

Opening speech

Mr. Sven Mikser, Chairman of Defense Committee of Parliament,
former Defense Minister, Estonia

After opening with a joke, the speaker began by presenting what he thought would be hot topics on the NATO Istanbul agenda – the NATO mission in Afghanistan (ISAF IV¹) and the NATO Response Force (NRF)². He explained that the Istanbul conference – Estonia's first NATO summit as an formal member – will be like “the first day of school for Estonia,” whose citizens often do not realize that changes in NATO since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 are perhaps greater than the changes that have occurred in Estonia.

The speaker then recited the changes that have occurred in NATO's focus chronologically – 1940s preparation for large-scale attack; 1950s nuclear deterrence; 1980s emphasis on dialogue and arms reductions; and 1991s continued reliance on large number of ground forces and reserves – to illustrate how very different the NATO of today – which embraces a broad security concept, ever-increasing partnerships and dialogue, and emphasis on crisis

¹ International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is a UN-mandated international force that was put into place at the end of 2001. The first mission was led by the United Kingdom and consisted of forces from other countries, most of which were NATO member countries. ISAF II was then led by Turkey, and ISAF III jointly by Germany and the Netherlands. The original mandate limited ISAF operations to Kabul and the surrounding areas, however, in October 2003, a UN Security Council resolution authorized the expansion of operations beyond Kabul. In August 2003, NATO took over responsibility for ISAF IV in Afghanistan to assist the Afghan Transitional Authority in creating a safe environment for the citizens of Kabul and the surrounding area. (p. 33)

² Intended to be fully operational by October 2006 and number some 21,000 troops, the NRF will provide a high-tech, flexible, rapidly deployable, interoperable and sustainable force, including land, sea, and air elements, capable of carrying out the full range of Alliance missions. It will be able to deploy to a crisis area within five days and sustain itself for 30 days. (p. 10)

management – is. The speaker then mentioned that the first invocation of Article V – in response to 9/11 – was quite different from Cold War perceptions of how Article V would be used.

Moving on to NATO’s tasks at hand, the speaker stated that operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan and the capability and usefulness of forces in these locations could prove politically problematic over time. He asserted that the operation in Afghanistan is a “litmus test” for NATO, which is operating for the first time far from its traditional sphere, and where warlords may still preside over much of the country even after elections. He asserted that failure for NATO is not an option, yet it remains a “distinct possibility” if problems are not remedied.

Moving back to Estonia, the speaker emphasized that having NATO aircraft patrol Estonian skies brought a comprehensive sense to security to the country. He mentioned that Estonia’s defense thinking was far from complete and that its goal of having 250 deployable troops for international missions annually had not yet been met.

The speaker closed by bringing up two challenging realities facing the Alliance: 1) the aftermath of the war in Iraq has led to a decline in support for military participation in *any* area of the world; and 2) although difficult, small countries need to work to professionalize their forces and mainstream their capabilities.

PANEL I: The Role of Public Diplomacy in NATO

9.00 **Mr. Jean Fournet, Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy, NATO**

The speaker commenced by calling the audiences’ attention to the fact that during the first 40 years of NATO’s existence there were 10 major summits, while in the last 14 years alone there have been 7. He then asserted that during his 3_ years at NATO he had witnessed “drastic changes” and increased responsibility and activity. He noted that one commonality between each NATO summit was that it helped to move the Alliance from static to dynamic.

Speaking of the upcoming Istanbul summit (28-29 June), the speaker highlighted the presence of many international events which also fall around the same period – D-day celebrations at Normandy, the G8 summit, EU parliamentary elections, the handover of sovereignty to Iraq – to highlight that journalists will be focused on many different happenings and are interested in results, not the generalities of diplomacy. In this regard, he stated that it is important to identify concretely what NATO is doing – projecting stability – and how this element reinforces NATO’s continued commitment to territorial defense.

The speaker continued by defining three ways in which NATO projects stability. The first way is through its **military operations**. Elaborating on this point, the speaker asserted that things are getting better in Afghanistan – Kabul is stable, soldiers are being trained, disarmament is occurring and the number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams³ (PRTs)

³The primary purposes of PRTs are to help the Government of Afghanistan extend its authority, to facilitate the development of a secure environment in the Afghan regions, including by establishing relationships with local authorities, and to support, as appropriate, security sector reform activities, within means and capabilities, to facilitate the reconstruction effort. The composition and geographical extent of PRTs will be determined by SACEUR, the Joint Force Commander and framework nations in light of the specific situation in the provinces

operating outside of Kabul is growing. Commenting on NATO's other current military operations, he stated that the Alliance will not depart from the Balkans even after handing over control to the EU.

The speaker continued by asserting that NATO is also working to increase peace by maximizing relations with current partners and working to enlist new partners, especially in the wider region of the Middle East. He stated that NATO will welcome Serbia and Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina into the Partnership for Peace⁴ (PfP). He affirmed that relations with Russia and Ukraine are being strengthened in a number of important areas, including cooperation on terrorism issues. On the topic of NATO-EU, the speaker stated that the European Security Strategy promotes strengthened security for all NATO members and that the relationship between the EU and NATO is marked by transparency, cooperation and complementarity. He stressed that the Mediterranean Dialogue⁵ was helping to improve political dialogue and practical cooperation on issues of terrorism and defense reform. Lastly, it was stressed that NATO retains its "open door policy".

The speaker highlighted the NRF as the third and final way that NATO projects stability. He said that the NRF is on track and will be operational in 2006. It was stated that the way in which NATO organizes for overseas missions is very important to maximizing the peace. In this respect, the NRF would be a deployable, sustainable, usable and credible way to deal with counterterrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) issues.

The speaker closed by underlining that the NATO of 2004 is very different from the NATO of even a few years ago. In this regard, three tasks remained particularly important for NATO's Public Diplomacy Division: 1) clear explanations of NATO's agenda to the public; 2) listening and dialogue; and 3) building support for NATO's agenda nationally. As to the former, he stated that different countries have different opinion formers – parliamentarians, NGOs, industry, media, etc. – and flagship events like this conference are exactly what NATO needs.

9.20 **Mr. Troels Frøling, Secretary General, Atlantic Treaty Association**

in which they operate, in close consultation with UNAMA and the Afghan authorities. Factors such as the security situation, the status of reconstruction, governance and the presence of other international agencies will play a role in defining the specific objectives of individual PRTs. (*NATO Factsheet*, 22.04.2004. Available at: <http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/factsheet.htm>)

⁴ The purpose of the PfP is to increase stability, diminish threats to peace and build strengthened security relationships between individual Partner countries and NATO as well as with other Partner countries. The formal basis for the PfP is the Framework Document, which sets out specific undertakings for each Partner country and enshrines a commitment by the Allies to consult with any Partner country that perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence or security. Each Partner makes a number of far-reaching political commitments to preserve democratic societies; to maintain the principles of international law; to fulfil obligations under the UN Charter, etc. – other key terms which may be of use: Partnership Work Programme, PfP Planning and Review Process, Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (p. 17).

⁵ The Mediterranean Dialogue, which is part of the Alliance's cooperative approach to security, aims to contribute to security and stability in the region, to achieve better mutual understanding and to correct misperceptions about NATO in Dialogue countries. Launched in 1995, the Mediterranean Dialogue includes Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. The political dialogue consists of regular bilateral political discussions at ambassadorial level. Practical cooperation is organized through an annual work programme. (p. 28)

The speaker began by dividing his speech into three parts: a brief description of the working environment of NATO countries, an analysis of the effects of globalization on security, and a presentation of the current strategy of the Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA).

Regarding countries and areas in which NATO works, the speaker mentioned first that Finland and Sweden were “de facto NATO members”. Moving to the Balkans, he explained that governments were supposed to be reforming and implementing the Copenhagen criteria⁶, but unfortunately the powerful presence of generals and warlords from the wars of the 1990s was still felt in this region. Speaking on transatlantic relations, the speaker noted that many positive features were shared on both sides of the Atlantic – the new world order structure based on recognition of the authority of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and democratic values to name two. He also highlighted sources of tension between the EU and the US – US unilateralism, the Abu Ghraib torture scandal, rising European anti-Americanism and beliefs in Europe that the EU should act as the antithesis of the US. The speaker brought this portion of the address to an end by asserting that the EU should seek to help the US fight terrorism via civil security measures and not through military action.

Moving on, the speaker underscored four aspects of globalization that are especially important in any security dialogue. He stated that globalization has led to the development of technology, which has led to both the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) as well as the proliferation of WMD. On this note, he affirmed that globalization is also increasing the number of world players, big powers who often seek WMD to gain influence in a “premier league” of states. More countries are also aspiring to become part of the new world order via liberal economic integration.

The speaker stated that Europe needs world stability for its own security. After 9/11, security-political questions are finally getting much attention and answers are being demanded. Because the US continues to protect Europe, transatlantic relations need “rejuvenation”, especially NATO, which remains the only transatlantic forum for security discussion and is the organizational necessity that links the EU and the US. He accentuated the need to ask questions about NATO’s role in the EU Security Strategy at the Istanbul summit.

Addressing the strategy of ATA, the speaker told of how ATA’s organizational vision was in a state of change from static to dynamic - the organization was more proactive and its 40 national chapters should no longer wait for their respective governments to tell them to do something. He then gave an example of much needed interorganizational cooperation: Russian journalists invited to Estonian seminars on developing democracy, to which he added that this kind of cooperation “goes both ways of course”.

In conclusion, the speaker got down to the specifics of ATA strategy: “security politics at the grassroots level”. To help accomplish this, he stated that ATA was establishing educational

⁶ Copenhagen Criteria: EU membership criteria require that the candidate country must have achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; the ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic & monetary union (<http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/intro/criteria.htm>)

chapters and hosting summer youth seminars, which brought together hundreds of students to discuss security policy and was supported by NATO's Public Diplomacy Division.

9.35 Dr. Lidija ehuli , Deputy President, Atlantic Council and Centre for International Studies, Croatia

The speaker initiated her speech by underlining the need to “upgrade” support for NATO in the Balkans. After 9/11, what was once “invisible terrorism” became reality. Along with terrorism, the world faces the risks of WMDs, failed states, organized crime and increasing levels of instability.

The speaker asserted that the Balkans support transatlantic relations and increasing EU security because they certainly do not want to see more bloodshed. Southeastern Europe needs transparency, diplomacy and open debate concerning NATO. It needs to avoid NATO propaganda.

Moving on, the speaker highlighted the ways in which the Atlantic Council of Croatia (ACC) was seeking to disseminate information. It organizes popular lectures which feature distinguished speakers, hosts “diplomatic picnics” where ambassadors are taken to learn about different parts of the country, and is in the process of publishing a new book – *NATO and New International Relations* – consisting of 18 papers dealing with NATO, the Balkans and Croatia. Commenting on the latter, she stated that the creation of a book is important because no such book yet exists and is much needed for students.

To conclude, the speaker noted that the ACC is hosting a summer school this year intended for young leaders which will consist of three seminars on NATO and Southeastern Europe and is. The seminars are free of charge and audience members are encouraged to contact her to find out more. She mentioned that the ACC had good connections with the new government and that hopefully this would lead to helpful sources of financing.

9.50 Open discussion

Q: A conference participant commented that Russian president Vladimir Putin was not going to be present at the NATO Istanbul summit. They then inquired as to what Russia's general perception of NATO was?

A: A panelist responded that roughly 67% of Russians perceive NATO as a threat. These perceptions cannot be remedied by a few speeches. He further elaborated on Russian perceptions by giving an example of a recent report made by a prominent Duma member. The first paragraph of the report began by appropriately identifying new security threats. The remainder of the report focused on traditional Cold War perceptions of NATO. The point of this example was to demonstrate the “great inertia” with which Russia responds to changes.

Q: Can NATO survive failure in Afghanistan?

A: A panelist stated that, like a golf stroke that one concentrates very hard on, the NATO mission in Afghanistan has to be a success because that is where the Alliance is currently focused. He stated that NATO is making good progress, consensus is strong, and the fact that the Istanbul summit loomed meant that countries were likely to cough up the necessary resources.

Q: Noting that the terrorist attacks in Madrid on 11 March 2004 led to a decline in support for military participation, a participant inquired as to whether small countries could maintain the political will to support foreign deployment in the face of a terrorist attack on their soil.

A: A panelist responded that it was very difficult in the case of Spain to establish a clear link between the terrorist attacks and the subsequent pullout of Spanish troops in Iraq.

Q: A participant asked whether reaching consensus in a NATO of 26 would pose problems.

A: A panelist acknowledged that crises do indeed necessitate quick decision making. He called the audiences' attention to NATO's decision to invoke Article V following the 9/11 attack – a decision that took only five hours – to demonstrate that NATO can certainly respond to key questions with quick consensus. He stated that when consensus could not be reached or was slow-coming, perhaps the decision was not as critical as the media might present it.

Q: A participant noted that women often have to watch their husbands and sons leave for peacekeeping missions. As they also have a prominent role in opinion-making, the participant wondered if NATO had any programs tailored specifically to women.

A: A panelist affirmed that it had been said in Afghanistan that if one wanted to reach the men, make a radio program for the women.

A_: A second panelist affirmed that a positive development in Croatia was the acceptance of a young woman as a military commander.

Q: A participant asked the panel to comment on the prospect of a Montenegrin vote on separation from Serbia.

A: One panelist stated that he had heard that they will probably vote for separation

A_: Another panelist commented that Southeastern Europe and the Balkans were pleased that they were no longer the center of the world's security attention.

Q: An inquiry was made as to the nature of the PfP and whether it would change.

A: It was noted that the PfP must increase its activities and cater its programs to the individual needs of partner countries.

PANEL II: The Baltic Sea Area – A Perspective Model of Regional Cooperation, Security and Stability

10.45 **Amb. Toomas Hendrik Ilves, MEP, former Foreign Minister, Estonia**

After beginning with a joke, the speaker made a number of points about security realities in the Baltic Sea area. He affirmed that the Baltic States had not become the “boiling cauldrons” of ethnic hatred that Russia predicted. The speaker then stated that the addition of the Baltic States to the EU had essentially transformed the Baltic Sea into a “European lake”. Lastly, he pointed out that it is impossible to discuss the security of the “Baltic region” without addressing all potential players.

Moving on, the speaker noted with certainty that Russia no longer provides a military threat. He then presented what he thought were the four foremost threats to Baltic area security:

1) The environment. The speaker pointed out that if an oil tanker similar to the *Prestige*⁷ were to crash or spill its oil in the Baltic, it could mean the end of coastal economic activity – fishing, shipping and tourism;

2) Nuclear power plant disaster. The speaker noted with concern that the Russian RBMK reactor near St. Petersburg had no containment shell, was Chernobyl-type, and had released a veil of radioactive steam⁸ that very week (the cause was said to be “human error”). He noted that the deduction made from a recent simulation of a Chernobyl-style disaster near St. Petersburg was that Estonia would become “uninhabitable”;

3) Chaos scenarios. Firstly, the speaker mentioned that political meltdown and a breakdown of social order in Belarus harbored the potential to bring thousands of Belarusian refugees streaming across the borders of Baltic States. Secondly, he noted that Russian spying and potential intervention in Kaliningrad posed significant challenges for the region.

4) Russian political meddling. The speaker noted that a number of Russian spies had recently been expelled from the Baltic States and that Russia had been using its sway in natural resources, namely oil, to place economic pressure on the region. He noted with concern Russia’s attempts to “foment unrest” in Latvia via harsh allegations about the mistreatment of the Russian minority. He stated that Russia imposes double tariffs on Estonian products. Lastly, he voiced concern over the influx of Russian capital and infrastructure into the region, as many of the contributing companies had ties to the Russian government.

The speaker closed his speech by stating that the EU, ESDP and the Northern Dimension are best suited to address the abovementioned security concerns. He openly questioned whether these institutions/policies had the political will to act accordingly, and advised that Europe get rid of the “peace, love and Woodstock” approach.

11.05 **Brig. Gen. Michael Clemmesen, Commandant, Baltic Defense College**

Addressing the topic of future Baltic co-operation in the security fields, the speaker began by stating that he “will not speak in tongues”. In this fashion, he opened by stating bluntly that the Baltic states do not like each other and that individuals often experience difficulties when trying to work with others across borders. This, he affirmed, was a hangover from Soviet times.

Speaking on the realities of current and past cooperation in the region, the speaker next addressed three Baltic collaborative efforts: BALTRON, BALTNET and BALTDEFCOL.

BALTRON: the naval project between the Baltic States required German support, professional soldiers and was focused on cooperation that concentrated on a common enemy, an army that the speaker thought was irrelevant;

BALTNET: this international effort required air surveillance equipment from other countries;

⁷ The oil tanker which leaked 21 million gallons of oil onto the coast of north-western Spain in November 2002 (<http://www.guardian.co.uk/flash/0,5860,843370,00.html>).

⁸ See <http://www.bellona.no/en/international/russia/npps/leningrad/34305.html>

BALTDEFCOL: also required international support and would not have happened without the speaker's efforts.

The speaker insisted that the Baltic region needed to bear witness to a "generational change". Currently, no Baltic state has the ability to set up needed specialist schools. He mentioned that although Finland gave support to the Baltics, this support was "not really useful" until Finland joined NATO; non-NATO courses provided problems and the speaker insisted on the need for harmonization. He also stressed the necessity of common equipment and logistics projects which would promote "plug-in" choices, enhance transparency and save money. The speaker noted that infantry brigade development cooperation, coordinated doctrine and school cooperation via the BALTDEFCOL course approach were also needed in the future.

Moving on, the speaker noted a number of matters which are important to discuss when explaining prospects for increased cooperation in the Baltic region:

- 1) The need for regional funds for transport, energy and structural development (the speaker noted that these systems are now primarily from the Soviet era)
- 2) Relations with Russia
- 3) Engagement of Belarus
- 4) Funds targeted particularly at poor areas in northeastern Estonia, eastern Latvia and northeastern and central Lithuania

Elaborating on these issues, the speaker noted Russia's ability to "make choices it otherwise could not" because of the current prices of oil (\$40 p/barrel). He insisted that in order to deal with Russia, the Baltic States must align with each other and EU Commission objectives. It was affirmed that the Baltic States should work with Russia only through the EU and not bilaterally.

11.20 Mr. Carl-Einar Stålvant, National Defense College, Sweden

The speaker began by calling attention to international forces of change affecting the Baltic region. He presented the north of Europe as a laboratory of sovereignty support, established organizations and overlapping patterns of functional projects. The speaker stated that the outcome of simultaneous NATO and EU enlargement has been a simplified structure via big bang changes and the disappearance of "gray zones".

The speaker continued by noting that questions have arisen about force placement. He mentioned that, in general, Baltic dialogue had been difficult. In this context, he observed that Finland and Sweden were in an interesting position as they were "non-aligned". The speaker mentioned that 2004 seemed to be a year a good year for Finland and Sweden to move forward in defining exactly how they will contribute to ESDP.

Moving briefly to NATO, the speaker highlighted questions about NATO's role in performing "out-of-area" missions.

The speaker then compared the positions of those countries on selected issues in the EU draft constitution. He found that Finland and Sweden generally agree, Estonia agrees about 60% of the time, and Germany and Denmark stand as the odd men out. He asserted that, as a bloc in the EU, the states that bordered the Baltic Sea could not form a successful voting bloc anyway.

In closing, the speaker affirmed that it was the challenging goal of the EU to strike a balance between equality of states and equality of citizens. He presented a diagram of NATO and EU strengths and highlighted NATO's "hard" security role - military, protection, offensive- and the EU's "soft" role – police, political and economic assistance.

11.35 **Mr. Timofei Bordachev, Director of Studies of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, Deputy Editor of *Russia in Global Affairs*, Russia**

The speaker commenced by asserting that Russia would one day apply for both EU and NATO membership. He stated that these links would complete European unification, increase economic ties, and lead to a European power equal to the US and emerging China.

The speaker noted two issues that were of particular concern. Firstly, he noted with disdain the notion held by some that NATO and the EU are meant to counterbalance Russia. Secondly, the speaker stated with enthusiasm that Russia is demonstrating its commitment to democracy via the opening up its markets and emphasis on free trade.

Moving on, the speaker offered two suggestions for bringing Russia and the EU and NATO closer together. He encouraged increased dialogue and cooperation on soft security issues in order to advance beneficial "spillover". Secondly, the speaker emphasized the need for the establishment of a non-visa regime between the EU and Russia.

The speaker closed by reminding the audience that talk of "buffer zones" and "bridges" between the EU and Russia contradicts the spirit of integration and openness championed by the EU.

11.50 **Mr. Ulrik Kragh, Deputy Chairman, Committee of Defense, Denmark**

The speaker began by informing the audience that he would speak about the political side of defense in the Baltic Sea area. He then went on to detail his thoughts on the 2005-2009 defense agreement reached in Denmark. The speaker detailed four aspects of the agreement that were particularly noteworthy:

- 1) Due to EU and NATO enlargement, conventional threats were virtually absent and therefore there exists little need for territorial defense.
- 2) The impact of technological development has vast implications for security
- 3) Because of the rise of asymmetric threats, Denmark needs to emphasize preventative measures and total defense
- 4) The Danish defense forces must be capable of total defense against terrorism and must maintain international deployability

The speaker noted with concern that the spread of weapons of mass destruction to non-state actors was a major threat. He asserted that failed states should not be ignored. In this respect, he emphasized Denmark's role in contributing to the effort to rebuild Afghanistan via the establishment of PRTs.

The speaker underlined the assistance Denmark gave to the Baltic States and Poland back in 1993 to prepare for NATO membership. He stated that Denmark identified the Balkans as an

area of concentration. He also highlighted Denmark's inclusion in Operation Iraqi Freedom. The speaker stressed that Denmark was committed to investing in defense and that Lord Robertson's "capabilities x 3" resonated clearly in Denmark.

In conclusion, the speaker remarked that the NATO Response Force had Denmark's full support and that the NRF was the "glue" binding the command and force structure together. He stated that it was of utmost importance that NATO and the EU did not duplicate each other, but instead use each other's forces. He asserted that NATO should always come first.

12.05 Open discussion

Q: "Capabilities" is not of primary concern. Proper concern centers on usability, deployability and sustainability when discussing the NRF. These three concepts are very expensive in reality and often very misunderstood in Europe. Does political will exist and can such a unit actually be effective?

A: A panelist noted that, in Denmark, the number of troops that can legally be deployed has increased from 1000-2000. He stated that Denmark sees the NRF as the "only way".

A_: Another panelist noted that the word "capabilities" often refers to the other three as well. He noted that it was a "scandal" that so few European forces were deployable. The panelist maintained that the number of officers had gone unchanged while troop numbers had steadily decreased. This reality had done little to increase deployability. Going further, he stated that there existed no political will, military exercises were not in English and forces were often deployed only as "political flags". The panelist stated that we could have 1/3 the number of forces, but actually be able to sustain them. He closed by noting that Germany is cutting 40% of its bases.

A_: A third panelist noted the need for a common arms procurement system because economies of scale do not exist in Europe. He stated that the US does not do nation-building and therefore it will become Europe's job in the future (albeit politically difficult).

A_: A fourth panelist highlighted that the March 2004 unrest in Kosovo was a good lecture in the need for rapidly deployable forces that are sustainable. He noted that Sweden is currently decreasing force numbers, but has increased amounts given to reform defense mechanisms by 100%.

Q: What military role do you foresee in the future for national militaries – in case of a rising threat in 10 years? What is the role for the military in the four threats that Amb. Ilves identified in his speech? Is the need for an assortment of troops with varying skills and specialties for inevitable post-war nation-building currently being overlooked?

A: One panelist suggested that if the entire EU had deployable troops then territorial defense would not be a problem. He affirmed that the NRF was a vehicle of transformation in this respect. He noted that we are at war with their (Islamist extremists) frustrations possibly for the next 30 years and that even coalitions of the willing could remedy foreseeable problems. The panelist asserted that Europe has been "sleeping during the past ten years" and that the EU Commission has no clear focus. He recommended slashing 30% of France's share of the CAP and investing in procurement methods. The panelist also recommended the English-language harmonization of military communication.

A_: A second panelist asserted that “boutiquing” (e.g. policing roles) was inevitable for small countries because they were not going to have “fighter pilots”. Referring to the four threats to the Baltic area, the panelist stated that he did not see a purely military role, but instead emphasized civil defense policing.

A_: A third panelist affirmed that it was important not to fall into a “stability” mindset, such as had been the case in present-day Kosovo.

A_: A fourth panelist made it known that peacekeepers in Kosovo had not been trained for riot control.

Q: Australia’s role in East Timor was highlighted and it was inquired as to whether Australia could be considered as a partner.

A: A panelist noted that multinational forces can be deployed anywhere in the world as long as they are interoperable.

Q: An audience member made it known that he was the father of an 8-year-old boy. He stated that he was planning to send his son to the military. He wondered whether he would be proud of a European unit. Would his son be well-equipped?

A: A panelist responded that equipment quality often depends on the government of the particular soldier’s country and that it was not up to the EU to train troops.

Q: How likely is a breakdown of consensus?

A: A panelist affirmed that consensus is strong and that the possibility of constructive abstention⁹ exists.

Q: A participant noted that various threats seem to emanate from Russia. He suggested that the solution, although complicated, entails every effort to engage Russia.

A: A panelist mentioned that we have heard about the need to “engage” Russia for 14 years, but that “talking shop” simply does not work. He noted that before 1991, engagement of the Soviet Union was stressed as well.

He noted that the EU does not act like a big state and affirmed that problems arose when big EU states bypassed the Council of Ministers and disregarded the Commission in order to make deals and retain “special relationships” with Russia. He stated that, because of this, when the EU Commission criticized Russia, Russia’s reaction was often to scoff at “silly bureaucrats in Brussels”.

The panelist closed by asserting that a cost-benefit analysis of engagement with Russia is a zero-sum game; Russia’s attitude is “we won’t clean up unless you give us a lot of money”.

A_: A second panelist noted that Finland has attempted to help St. Petersburg, Russia with its waste water treatment system since 1991 (or before), but work did not start until last year (2003).

⁹ This would signify that the member state concerned chooses not to participate in the decision, but does not impede action by the other member states (<http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb1503.htm>)

A_: A third panelist noted that, in order to fix its policy towards Russia, the EU Commission needed the opinions of the Eastern European member states. He hoped that Russia will normalize like Germany, without the devastating war, but in such a way that it comes to terms with its history.

A_: A fourth panelist noted that of 68 disturbances in the Baltic Sea last year, 19 were near Russia.

A^a: The final panelist to comment noted that “Americans look at the globe, the EU looks at a map”. He affirmed that the EU needed to “look at the globe”. He closed by highlighting the transition of France; in 1958 France was in the midst of a brutal colonial war, now much is different.

PANEL III: New Risks, New Threats, New Approaches to Security

14.30 **Mrs. Kristiina Ojuland¹⁰, Foreign Minister, Estonia**

The speaker commenced by asserting that NATO and the EU shared similar values. She noted with enthusiasm that Estonia was proud to join NATO. The speaker downplayed major traditional threats, instead choosing to emphasize security challenges such as terrorism, WMD, organized crime, trafficking and failed states. She asserted that countries must unite and join forces to resist potential problems arising from these challenges.

Speaking of the Estonian security strategy agreed upon on 27 May 2004, the speaker pointed out a number of key elements:

- 1) Estonia would actively participate as NATO and EU allies.
- 2) Estonia would continue to participate in international situations – crisis management, peacekeeping.
- 3) Estonia would cooperate with allies to develop Estonia’s defense forces.
- 4) Estonia complies with NATO and the Washington Treaty and will spend 2% of GDP on defense.

The speaker went on to point out that the 11 March attacks in Madrid prove that Europe is as vulnerable as any part of the world to terrorist attacks. She affirmed that Estonia will stay in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Balkans. She emphasized the importance of strengthening transatlantic relations.

In closing, the speaker asserted that ISAF success in Afghanistan is important. She affirmed that Estonia believes a new UN Security Council resolution is necessary before the 30 June 2004 transition of sovereignty in Iraq. She highlighted Estonia’s support for the Georgia Action Plan. The speaker finished by noting that Estonia was ready to join the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty.

14.45 **Brief open discussion period**

Q: Where is Estonia in Europe?

¹⁰ Note: the speech was in Estonian. My notes are taken entirely from the translator and therefore I may have missed some important points.

A: Estonia has supported EU membership from the start. Estonia is now supporting Georgia's NATO bid.

Q: What is the state of Estonia-Russia relations?

A: This is something that is always "hanging over our heads". Both sides have stated the desire to move forward. Implementation of these statements is the problem. We must be patient.

Q: Is Belarus in the EU neighborhood?

A: Belarus has so far been a "black hole". However, I am optimistic about changes in the near future.

14.50 **Prof. Dr. Michael Mihalka, East European Studies, College of International and Security Studies, Marshall Center**

The speaker began with a question: Has conflict increased, decreased or remained the same since the end of the Cold War? He stated that, when asked the question, 90% of respondents at the Marshall Center responded that conflict had increased. However, one Hungarian captain answered that it has decreased and this is the correct answer.

The speaker noted that Stanley Hoffman has stated that globalization and expansion of the media leads to increased conflict; more and more, poor people around the world compare their lives to the lives of the more affluent and get angry. This anger, according to Hoffman, leads to conflict. The speaker stated that Hoffman is wrong. We must believe in globalization.

The speaker stated that, since 1991, two factors have changed:

- 1) The world has experienced an increase in globalization
- 2) Armed conflict has decreased

According to the speaker, armed conflict has decreased because of an end of competition between the East and West. This competition between ideologies – Sovietism vs. liberalism – led to many conflicts in Africa during the Cold War.

The speaker continued with another question: will this type of competition exist in the near future? He next identified emerging centers of power as Russia, India and China. The speaker affirmed that, ideologically, these centers of power are not in competition – all are in or seek to be included in the WTO, and all seem to agree on a version of the liberal economic order. Even if all three do not agree exactly to the same principles or mechanisms, it is important to note that none are actively opposing the liberal economic order or offering any alternative. Therefore, it can be concluded that ideological competition of the Cold War-type is no longer a factor.

Moving on, the speaker noted that, of the 26 conflicts in 2002, two-thirds had an Islamist nature. As examples, he underlined conflicts in Afghanistan, Algeria, Iraq and Sudan. The speaker asserted that there presently exists a new ideological battleground – liberalism vs. Islamism. The speaker noted that, in Lebanon, a recent poll confirmed that 73% of Muslims supported suicide bombing in defense of Islam, even though suicide is forbidden by the Koran. He noted that conflicts typically begin in Muslim-dominated countries and are likely

to be sustained. He noted that conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq are likely to get worse before they get better.

The speaker continued by laying out the potential impact of continued terrorist attacks on Western targets:

- 1) increase in oil prices; he underlined that hedge fund speculation has already affected oil barrel prices by \$6-10 per barrel
- 2) Russia as a “petrol state” will likely increase its “mischief-making”

The speaker affirmed that rapid transition to liberal democracy was the only solution – as the world has witnessed in Eastern and Central Europe. He noted that no democracy theorist predicted that Iraq would transform quickly, and that President Bush paid no heed to this.

The speaker ended with a number of dire predictions for the future:

- 1) increase in ideological competition
- 2) increase of sustained violence
- 3) increase in oil prices
- 4) decrease in growth of the world economy
- 5) increase of the risk of terrorist attacks on liberal democracies

15.05 **Dr. Gabor Brodi, Assistant State Secretary of Foreign Ministry, former Ambassador to OSCE, Hungary**

The speaker began by discussing the supposed Istanbul agenda as well as NATO in general. He stated that no new names of potential member states would be discussed at the summit, but that it was important to pay heed to those who aspired to become members in the future. The speaker noted that the beneficiaries of NATO’s recent enlargement are Central Asian countries and those militarily non-aligned EU countries, as these groups would be brought closer to decision-making procedures. He suggested that decision-making in NATO should be further streamlined and improved and that capabilities must be provided where lacking. He underlined that ISAF and Iraq will be high on the Istanbul agenda.

The speaker next inquired as to whether NATO success in Afghanistan was a precondition to the successful transformation of the Alliance. He went on to state that we should be cautious when making political promises, especially in the case of Afghanistan, where the security situation of the country is composed of many differing factors.

He affirmed that the Hungarian government’s idea of success revolves around whether cooperation between NATO and the EU can be attained and whether the rules governing these organizations can be adjusted properly.

The speaker stated that while NATO is transforming, we should not forget old priorities, namely NATO’s traditional hard security guarantees. Elaborating further, he asserted that the most important part of the Istanbul’s “hidden agenda” was whether hard security guarantees would be moved from NATO to ESDP. He noted that the EU cannot yet cope fully with such responsibility. The speaker highlighted that if hard security guarantees were included in ESDP it would pose “big questions” for the non-aligned/neutral members of the EU.

In closing, the speaker stated that Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and Russia are currently in a “grey zone” and that questions loom over whether their respective transitions are irreversible. On this note, the speaker imagined that Russia, because of progress and free trade, could one day become a member of both the EU and NATO. Lastly, he affirmed that the Balkans must be assured of eventual membership.

15.20 Prof. Dr. Anton Bebler, President, Atlantic Council, Slovenia

The speaker opened up by calling the audiences’ attention to the fact that NATO’s Art. V has been invoked only one time, and was not followed up on by any collaborative military action by NATO. He then posed two questions:

- 1) How relevant is confronting terrorism for NATO?
- 2) How important has NATO been in the struggle against terrorism?

The speaker continued by emphasizing that, since the 1970s, 12 UN Conventions against terrorism have been developed, yet every major country – including the US – has largely ignored these Conventions. He went on to assert that, historically, NATO has paid little attention to terrorism.

The speaker noted that terrorism has existed and been a threat to NATO member states – France, Spain, Greece and Portugal - for a long time, but NATO has just recently taken heed of these threats. He stated that NATO member states have traditionally held either ambivalent or differing attitudes on how to approach terrorism. In many cases, states have maintained double standards when judging terrorist acts depending on whether they occur at home or on foreign soil. In the past, state-sponsored terrorism was often overlooked.

The speaker stressed that he thought NATO would have moved faster after the end of the Cold War to respond to terrorist activity. Quite to the contrary, he noted that little change in NATO’s strategy occurred during the 1990s and that “Islamist fundamentalism” was first mentioned by NATO’s Secretary General in 1995.

Expanding on this, the speaker next detailed reasons for NATO’s slow/lack of adaptation. He stated that traditional understanding of NATO’s role as a military alliance geared towards countering a massive military attack perpetuated static notions and inactivity. He asserted that beliefs that terrorism fell outside of the scope of the Alliance also hindered transformation.

Explaining further, the speaker noted that Turkey tried for years to call attention to the phenomenon of terrorism, but was consistently struck down because terrorism was seen a domestic issue. He noted that this view was not unfounded; formerly, terrorism was generally associated with national issues – the suppressing of armed groups, or turbulence associated to changes in the status of minority groups. The speaker also underlined that historically and not all that infrequently states would support or shelter terrorist groups as long as these groups attacked within the borders of other states.

The speaker moved on to explaining what NATO has done to counter terrorism. He noted that NATO has undertaken primarily military measures. He affirmed that statements that alluded to the struggle against terrorism as being a “success” were “gross exaggerations”. The speaker noted that success has been limited. He asserted that terrorism has deep social roots and that military force to counter terrorism will only have limited effects.

The speaker suggested that counterterrorism efforts must include social, economic, legislative, judicial, and law enforcement measures – all of which fall outside the breadth of NATO’s activities. He asserted that while terrorism is global, NATO remains a regional organization.

In conclusion, the speaker stated that, in the present, insufficient consensus existed on what antiterrorism measures are legitimate and what NATO’s role should be. He maintained that while the attacks of 9/11 had increased worldwide solidarity, current confusion was having negative effects politically.

15.35 **Dr. Giovanni Gasparini, Research Fellow, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Italy**

The speaker began by asserting that today’s “global threats” referred to a combination of both old and new threats and that NATO must be able to act globally or risk irrelevance. He noted that NATO is used to conceptions of traditional military defense, but that many new threats cannot be dealt with by a military organization.

On this note, he encouraged the audience to “fear not”, because NATO should be included and complimented by the EU in broad assessments. He assured that NATO has political relevance as it remains a multilateral forum in which the US and EU discuss issues according to fixed rules. He noted that bilateral dialogue can be bad for security and cited lack of intelligence sharing and the inability to “plug and play” as cases in point.

The speaker went on to assert that the NATO Istanbul summit was “not focused on the right issues”. He noted with concern that the agenda was not satisfactory and “not focused on the real threat” – the southern flank of the alliance. He suggested that NATO should refocus on what it can do better: military intervention on the “high-end section”, planning, rules and leadership.

The speaker stated that NATO is not suited for the Greater Middle East Initiative (GMEI) because little political will, money or troop commitment. He suggested that the EU backed by NATO would do well concerning the GMEI. Secondly, the speaker noted that NATO needed to distance itself from the “silly politics” of the US (e.g. grudges against allies).

Concerning NATO, the speaker stated that he feared that the US was not involved enough politically and that the EU did not retain effective capabilities. Europe could “talk the talk, but not walk the walk”. He stated that the US needed to be deterred from using the “toolbox” method because “failure *is* the toolbox method” (emphasis added).

Moving on, the speaker affirmed that the EU security concept is much more inclusive and comes with lots more tools. He stated that there is a need for a division of labor between the US and the EU, and that this division should be planned for in advance; this kind of planning has not happened in Iraq and states are presently not prepared or willing to participate.

The speaker asserted that more cooperation was necessary, but that it was not taking place. He stated that NATO was relevant for Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, but that ISAF needs a package of civil security measures. He mentioned that Berlin Plus was working, but not enough is being done to remedy problems between NATO and the EU.

15.50 Gen. Ole Martin Hojem, Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Military Cooperation, NATO Rapid Deployable Corps

The speaker began by noting that NATO and ISAF recognize a wider range of activity and that part of their strategic concept is crisis management and civilian matters. He stated that Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) maintained three core functions:

- 1) Support for military missions
- 2) Liaise with civil actors
- 3) Support the civil environment

The speaker went to note that CIMIC will always play a role. He affirmed that there had been success in Kabul, but that more improvement is needed; half of the population suffered from physical and/or psychological damage and often lacked medication.

The speaker asserted that ISAF's purpose in Afghanistan is to assist the security situation in Kabul and in surrounding areas. Its primary tasks are:

- 1) Make civil estimates
- 2) Make contacts with civilian population and authorities
- 3) Liaise with international and non-governmental organizations (IOs/NGOs)
- 4) Monitor and initiate quick impact projects (QIPs)

The speaker highlighted that CIMIC assists by making civil estimates in many areas including food, water, reconstruction, health, power and shelter. He referenced the reconstruction of a women's grieving hall as one of the projects that CIMIC is supporting.

The speaker underlined the use of a color-coded system to assess quality of life factors.

Red = difficult
Yellow = tolerable
Green = good

The speaker next presented a water assessment map of Kabul which showed that water quality was "good" only in the very center region of the city. He noted bleakly that it would take 10 years to develop a water system in Kabul.

Speaking on CIMIC's role in making contacts with the civilian population, the speaker noted that it is important to avoid cultural mistakes; CIMIC staff must make sure to "play on the same ground".

Very briefly, the speaker highlighted a few organizations that CIMIC liaises with: UN, EU, ministries and municipalities.

Speaking about QIPs, the speaker underlined that these projects were based on civil estimates and embraced a "hearts and minds" approach. Projects included hiring local contractors and workers to build a waste and sewage pump station. The speaker noted sternly that CIMIC never pays in advance; CIMIC had learned from the unfortunate experiences of a few international organizations had made the mistake of doing so.

The speaker noted that one of CIMIC's roles was to provide force protection by reinforcing a positive relationship with local residents.

Discussing CIMIC's pre-deployment approach, the speaker noted that the first thing that must be discussed is CIMIC's assets. Next, CIMIC commanders should make sure that they have firm control of these assets. Finally, CIMIC must liaise with IOs and NGOs that are already working in the field.

The speaker noted with concern that CIMIC was more than just projects. However, CIMIC should not be misconstrued as a nation-builder, and it is not in competition with IOs or NGOs.

The speaker highlighted that significant funding for CIMIC comes from the EU Commission, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands, Norway and private donors. Unfortunately, this aid is often tied to specific projects, thus handcuffing the CIMIC commander by making him or her use funds in ways that are sometimes inefficient.

The speaker closed by noting that it is important not to overlook gender and ethnicity when supporting PRTs across Afghanistan. He mentioned that the NRF is neglecting the civilian factor and that CIMIC needs to be involved, as it is currently underutilized.

16.05 Open discussion

Q: A participant noted that there had been problems with PRTs in Afghanistan. He inquired as to whether there was a specific goal in Afghanistan. If so, what is this goal and is it achievable?

A: A panelist noted gravely that he was "not optimistic" about Afghanistan or current developments there. He stated that the country was segmented into ethnic groups and presided over by warlords. The speaker underlined that the family was the main support group for Afghans, and that inhabitants only started to extend their security concerns further (into the "valley") once their respective families were safe.

As an example of current Afghan unruliness, the speaker noted that only seven months earlier the Afghan Minister of Defense and his deputy were rival warlords who repeatedly fought against each other.

The speaker noted that he supports the stability brought by PRTs. He stated that the population is war-weary, but that warlords are refusing to give up their power and arms. He stressed that warlords will often pay taxes, but never enough to demonstrate that they are committed to supporting the Afghan government. The speaker stated that he did not know what the goal in Afghanistan was.

Q: Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate that one cannot simply bring democracy by force. How does one prepare?

A: One speaker noted that he "doesn't dream of democracy".

A_: A second speaker highlighted that "bringing democracy" was not a formula supported by the UN. He asked why we should try to it from the top down. Democratization in the Middle East must happen at the grassroots level with the help of civil society and changing

social norms. The speaker asserted that goals in the Middle East should be modest. Regimes which demonstrate a desire for change should be assisted.

A_: A third speaker explained that Paul Wolfowitz (US Deputy Secretary of Defense) believed that the invasion of Iraq would lead to a democratic Iraq which would serve as a model for the rest of the Middle East. President Bush embraced this model – the “liberal imperative” - because he wanted to, even in the face of contradictory evidence.

1) Bush believed that Iraq was truly secular. Although Iraq had been oriented that way due to years of religious suppression, Bush misread the secular nature of the Iraqi people.

2) Bush thought that Iraq’s transformation would be self-financing. This belief was based on intelligence sources which failed to observe Iraq’s antiquated oil exploitation infrastructure. Due to years of sanctions, oil industry infrastructure had been seriously neglected.

3) Many thought that political Islamism was dead. The socialist ideology adopted by Nasser and others had failed, but unlike Estonia, the Middle Eastern countries are not located next to liberal democracies that want to transform them.

4) The belief was held by many that the Middle East had exported its “bad guys”; Saudi Arabia had sent 40,000 to fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan.

The panelist noted that democratic transition theorists had given no indication that Iraq was ready for liberal democracy. Instead, it was highlighted that trying to impose democracy by force would only heighten instability, which would be further exploited by insurgents.

The panelist closed by noting that the only condition in which liberal democracy can be brought to countries that are poor with no infrastructure and no history of democracy is if their leaders – the elites – decide to guide them towards it.

A_: A fourth panelist asserted that the war on terrorism inspires acceptable fear of the loss of democracy in the form of infringements on civil liberties. He noted that the war on terrorism is going in the wrong direction, as Guantanamo Bay so illustrates. He affirmed that we do not know what winning entails, but we are well aware of what losing entails.

The speaker noted that democracy is an ideology and not a tangible commodity. He stated that force can protect democracy, but it cannot install it. Despite this, ideologists clash with reality and keep on clashing with it. The speaker affirmed that one cannot simply say “her is democracy, here is freedom”. He noted with concern that we are currently betraying the principles of democracy in order to defend it. This is not only hypocritical, but people are dying as well.

A_: Another panelist noted that the victims of the war on terrorism are human rights and personal freedoms. He asserted that the Patriot Act should be read carefully; under the Act, an anti-globalization protester who breaks down a fence can be arrested for terrorism. He noted that the Patriot Act is having corrosive effects on existing democratic institutions.

17.00 Conclusion

The Ambassador noted that it was not his job to draw conclusions of substance, but to leave this up to the audience. He noted that the conference was rich in ideas from professionals who were open-minded, provocative and forthcoming. He mentioned that he thought a conference was good if you got just one new idea. The ambassador thanked all for attending.