

**Seminar Report: Swedish Atlantic Committée's Youth Organization's
Nordic/Baltic Security Conference in Stockholm, 24-25 April 2004**

Seminar Report

The Atlantic Committée of Sweden's Youth Organization's

Nordic/Baltic Security Conference

**Stockholm
24-25 April 2004**

Report contributors:

Mr Janne HALTTU, Mr Martti SETÄLÄ and Mr Patrik TÖRNROOS

Report compiled by Mr Martti SETÄLÄ

Email. mssetala@hotmail.com

19 May 2004

**Seminar Report: Swedish Atlantic Committée's Youth Organization's
Nordic/Baltic Security Conference in Stockholm, 24-25 April 2004**

Table of Contents

- 1.Seminar Program**
- 2.Overall comments on the Seminar**
- 3.Summary of discussions**

1.Seminar Program

**The Second Nordic/Baltic YATA Conference:
"Contemporary Security Challenges"**

Day one

10.00-10.15 Welcome address

Colonel Bo Hugemark, President of the Swedish Atlantic Treaty Association

10.15-12.15 "From War to Peace"

Maj. Johan Victorin, Swedish National Defence College, "Contemporary Warfare"

Mr. Niklas Granholm, Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), "International Peace Support Operations"

13.30-14.30 Working group session

14.30-15.30 "Towards a New Transatlantic Partnership?"

Ambassador Alyson Bayles, Director of SIPRI

15.45-16.45 "Security in the Baltic Sea Region Post-EU and NATO Enlargement"

Ambassador Krister Wahlbäck, Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (retired)

19.00 Evening reception:

Address by Mr. Petr Lunak, Head of NATO Outreach Office

Day two

10.00-11.30 "The Institutional Arrangements in the Nordic/Baltic Region"

Ms. Sunniva Tofte, University of Bath, "The Insider Outsider Dilemma – A Perspective from Norway"

Ms. Jenny Clevström, FOI, "The Insider Outsider Dilemma – A Perspective from Sweden"

Ms. Nathalie Vogel, University of Innsbruck, "Does neutrality still exist? – A Perspective from Austria"

11.30-12.30 Working group session

13.30-14.00 "The Future of the Youth Atlantic Treaty Association"

Mr. Troels Egeskovrensen, President of YATA

14.00-14.30 Discussions and presentations of the various YATA organisations in the Nordic/Baltic Region

14.30-15.50 Developments in the Euro-Atlantic Security Community

Associate Professor Ingemar Dörfer, FOI, "US Military Globalised"

Dr. Mike Winnerstig, FOI, "The Future of NATO"

15.50-16.00 Closing address

Mr. Branimir Knezevic, President of the Swedish Youth Atlantic Treaty Association

Seminar Report: Swedish Atlantic Committée's Youth Organization's Nordic/Baltic Security Conference in Stockholm, 24-25 April 2004

2. Overall comments on the Seminar

The seminar is a second seminar in a "series" of annual seminars that focus on Nordic/Baltic region security issues. The first seminar in this series was organized by the Norwegian Atlantic Committée's youth branch in April 2003. In the year 2004, the seminar gathered ca 40 students and young professionals to Stockholm. They came mostly from Nordic countries. The worrisome change from 2003 was that the Baltic participation had diminished greatly: only one participant came from Estonia and none from Latvia or Lithuania. Nevertheless, Norwegians and Danes participated with high numbers, both delegations containing up to ten persons. The low participation from the Baltic states was explained by their new financial situation as the accessions to both EU and NATO are almost concluded – it has become harder for them to get EU/NATO support as the organizations' focus moves further south and east. Hopefully this does not become a trend that hinders participation possibilities for the Baltic youth, but is just a temporary setback.

Two days seemed too little a time to get to know everybody and to have time for extensive discussion and exchange of views and information. However, even the brief discussions proved to be most interesting in deepening understanding of the Nordic positions and current debate. It was evident that on international level the prospects for intensifying Nordic cooperation seem weak, since the Nordics participate in Euro-Atlantic security cooperation in different ways, and since most of the security threats and problems demand wider multilateral solutions based on global or Euro-Atlantic engagement. This does not mean that the Nordic/Baltic seminar concept would be flawed. What the Nordics have in common is an active will to participate through policies of multilateral engagement in solving the regions security problems. Also, the problems are particular to this region, whether related to issues in the High North or the Baltic Sea area. The dialogue achieved in these seminars helps understand the different solutions that the Nordics have chosen and helps exchange ideas and information that can bring fresh perspectives and options to national debates. This is why it is important to ensure wide participation not only from Nordic states but the Baltic ones, Russia, the U.S. and perhaps Germany and Poland.

The seminar is to be arranged in Finland in 2005. The concept is healthy and promising. For the next seminar, the objectives are as follows: 1. Focus on Nordic/Baltic area security and defence issues, 2. Stimulation of dialogue between youth of Euro-Atlantic area, 3. Strong Nordic participation, solid Baltic participation, and participation from both US and Russia.

3. Summary of discussions

"From War to Peace"

Researcher Niklas Granholm, FOI

As a matter of choice, we skip the first lecture and start with the second remarks by Niklas Granholm who discussed peace operations and their changing nature in today's world.

During cold war the military political situation based strict limits for peace operations. In the period, Peace keeping could be seen as a part of long term norm building in the

Seminar Report: Swedish Atlantic Committée's Youth Organization's Nordic/Baltic Security Conference in Stockholm, 24-25 April 2004

international environment. The first modern peace operation was created in the aftermath of the Suez crisis in 1956, and was followed by Congo in 1960-1964 and Cyprus in 1964-1966. From the October war of 1973 to the end of 1980's the concept of operations remained rather unchanged. This concept was based on the idea to "observe and report", and was deployed often at the end-phase of inter-state conflicts. The operations were mostly directly run by the UN. Impartiality was equidistance between the conflict parties. Use of force concept was limited to strict self defence, (and sometimes not even that was used). The Great Power blocks served as guarantors against conflict escalation.

After 1988, the situation started to change. There was a return to history, as some frozen conflicts heated up. Failed states changed scope from inter-state to intra-state conflicts, where parties are often unclear and civilians are targeted. UN lost its credibility in the course of Sarajevo 1992-1995, and especially, Srebrenica massacre.

How did this change the concepts of peace operations? Impartiality had to be reinterpreted, the need for use of force increased substantially, the use of heavy weapons became the rule rather than the exception, and UN was still preferred in mandating, but not necessarily prosecuting operations (see NATO, EU, OSCE or coalitions of the willing). Sweden crosses a national watershed as it enters into a Great Power coalition in Bosnia 1994, something unseen since 1815.

International operations today are marked by gradually wider scope, earmarked units, and no unilateralism. Peace support and peace operations are umbrella concepts. Peace keeping can happen only with the consent of all parties of conflict. Peace enforcement is often linked to the Chapter VII of the UN treaty.

International operations tomorrow are created for a better security environment. Distance from conflict areas does not help in their prosecution. Risks and costs have increased heavily. The aid projects and peace operations are intertwined. Both are needed for a success. There are questions on whether traditional peace keeping operations are no longer needed (like in Somalia-Eritrea at the moment..). What shape and form does the cooperation with others take? Shall there be more network-centric operations? How to prioritise operations? Smaller or bigger, symbolic or real efforts? How to balance territorial operations and international operations of national armed forces?

In the question and answer part, lively discussion emanated. Some extracts: Is conflict prevention possible? Intervention is incredibly costly and unsure of success. How to get enough information? Was Cyprus operation a help or a hindrance? Need to know the Great Power power games behind the scenes. Interventions are usually too little and too late. What if terrorists get WMD? They already have: see Jordan and the preventing of a chemical agent strike in Amman. To combat terrorism there are two parallel ways: the use of military, police, and the like means, and to root out the base factors that create cultures favourable for terrorism (see economic and social problems etc).

**Seminar Report: Swedish Atlantic Committée's Youth Organization's
Nordic/Baltic Security Conference in Stockholm, 24-25 April 2004**

“Towards a New Transatlantic Partnership?”

Ambassador Alyson Bayles, director of SIPRI

Alyson Bayles gave perhaps the most interesting remarks of the seminar. She discussed three main themes: 1.General advice i.e. the do's and the dont's. 2.Perspective on NATO / EU changing roles. 3.Advice for the Europeans.

First of all, one should demystify NATO. Historically, Europeans were the imperialists and Americans the "good and peace loving" guys. The emphasis in the transatlantic relation can change from the military relation to other spheres. It is important to see institutions as instruments and not as an end in itself. The latter approach only leads to quarrelling between institutions which is completely useless. Institutions should not be primarily seen to reflect unity but to solve issues in relationships. Management at the end of the cold war went through OSCE, Council of Europe, and multiple other organizations (NATO included). NATO's issues affect normal lives of normal people rarely in the member states, a lot more effect arises if the IMF or the WHO fails. Therefore, let's relativise NATO, and the EU!

Secondly, the enlargement of EU affects the lives of many, but NATO enlargement does not. Both are nevertheless politically there. According the Rumsfeld the mission defines the coalition that is not restricted by international law. Iraq was a crisis, but NATO has a role in Afghanistan. The big problem is how to get the daily feeling of solidarity? In the cold war days there were daily exercises between the NATO nations. Today they are rare. Is NATO to be put into an agency role?

Third, NATO as organization is not in the core of combat against terrorism. It has some useful functions but they can be used only incidentally. EU constitution is likely to be adopted in June, and its solidarity clause is a modern replacement for the NATO article V. The EU-US trade relationship is very conflictual – like the relationship between NATO and the Warsaw Pact used to be. How could we get security issues through and settled in that forum? The critical question is what the Europeans want? They should not want just a transatlantic institution for its own sake, nor just influence over the US. What does Europe need? What are the European terms of discussion? This cannot be a simple yes/no to America question. What should the European security agenda contain? Russia, can it be integrated? Balkans? New EU members? What is the transatlantic alliance standing on?

During the Q&A session it was asked why Al Qaeda is not a European problem, it was answered that it is a global problem. Also the question of US-European/New European vs. Old European common interests was addressed. We do have common interests. New members backed all EU policies. The CEE countries believe in NATO and not in bilateral diplomacy with the US. It is likely that the extremely anti-atlantic rhetoric will continue, but that a Euro-Atlantic and a European "we" exist.

Security in the Baltic Sea Region post-EU and NATO enlargement

Ambassador Krister Wahlbäck, Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (retired)

The new security situation. The basis is the fact that the two dangerous great powers, Germany and Russia, have been tamed. Germany is the most pacifistic, least prone to thinking along the traditional big power instincts. According to an opinion poll the

Seminar Report: Swedish Atlantic Committée's Youth Organization's Nordic/Baltic Security Conference in Stockholm, 24-25 April 2004

ideal security policy examples for the Germans are Sweden and Switzerland. The Germany of today doesn't see itself as a great power like France and Britain. Russia is in the process of being tamed. In the traditional territorial sense Russia is not that interested in acquiring new areas. The picture is however rather complex. The present Yeltsin-Putin line will however continue at least for a decade. Russian imperialism will though present itself in the Caucasus and East-Asia. Putin has clearly expressed his will to improve the economic and social condition of Russia. In the long run an emergence of a more chauvinist, traditional imperialist leadership is a possibility. Thus it is clear that a great deal of co-operation with Russia is needed not the least because of the problems of smuggling of arms, drugs and other criminal activities. The environmental problems posed by the Russian oil transports or the nuclear plants need to be addressed. The main point is to try to build the relationship between EU and Russia into one of co-operation not a competition or destructive rivalry. It is though not easy since the Russians are very difficult to work with as they have strong tradition of big power attitude and style. To change Russia is like breathing on a glacier.

In Nordic countries, not maybe Finland, there is a need to develop the defense capacity towards the new top priority tasks, not the traditional Art. 5 tasks. The new transformed tasks for NATO are to project military power outside Europe in order to f.ex./e.g. stabilize the situation or to intervene in the matters of cruel regimes. This has only indirect connection with the security situation in the Baltic Sea region. The national military forces have to perform a very difficult balancing act in establishing new forces and strategies. The Swedish military has, for example, already to a large extent abandoned the old "suit" and is now tailoring the new one. Reserve capacity needs to be maintained in case something would turn the enigmatic Russia into something dangerously different.

What if Sweden and Finland would join NATO? It is clear that they would acquire influence over NATO decision making and other deliberations. From the NATO perspective its effectiveness in the Baltic Sea region would increase clearly with the large input of new coastline.

Q&A:

Q: Why should we view Russia being in the process of being tamed?

A: There is no single yardstick to judge the developments. One needs to observe public debate, official comments etc. The Russian position is clearly very imperialistic compared to the pacifistic German approach. Generally it can be said that democracies tend to be more peaceful than the authoritarian or semi-authoritarian governments.

Q: How to proceed in the stabilizing process of Russia?

A: Russia is such a large country that to influence it as a whole is almost impossible. Nordic countries should therefore focus on certain areas, ex the Northwest Russia with only about 15 million people. Russia has never experienced anything like open western society. Still the Nordic countries should not put up with anything. The integration with Russia is a very dissimilar process but there is no good alternative to it. Kant argued that the real force for peace is the commercial interest. Even though it is no guarantee, the business integration surely helps.

**Seminar Report: Swedish Atlantic Committée's Youth Organization's
Nordic/Baltic Security Conference in Stockholm, 24-25 April 2004**

“The Institutional Arrangements in the Nordic/Baltic Region”

The Insider-Outsider Dilemma – A Perspective from Norway
Ms. Sunniva Tofte, University of Bath

Norway attained independence from Sweden in 1905. The general sentiment was that Norway doesn't need a foreign policy. The WWII and the subsequent Cold War changed all that. Norway joined NATO in 1949 as the only country to have land border with the Soviet Union. For a long period of time Norway received nine times as much as it contributed from the Common Investment Fund. The Cold War setting is now history and Norway has lost its favoured position within NATO.

NATO has new priorities diverging from those of Norway. The enlargement, and threats originating somewhere else than Russia, turn the focus away from the Northern dimension. The new tasks of NATO are not traditional Art V tasks. The incident of Turkey and blocked Article IV discussions in NATO during the Iraq crisis increased worries in the Norway. There is concern in Norway that they will be marginalized and that this will lead in a decrease of security. The Norwegian perception is that the country cannot alone provide for its own security.

EU has emerged as an actor for European security policy and functions as a discussion forum. EU is also a socialization process which produces EU security culture. Norway expected to get an agreement to join the ESDP after St. Malo. This would have meant participation to ESDP development and decision making without a membership in the EU. Norwegians were turned down though.

What could then the worst case scenario be like? Ms.Tofte explained that ex border/resource dispute with Russia in the High North could be such. It could be too small for NATO to activate the Art V and risk relations with a valuable partner Russia (with which the US could have coinciding interests). The ESDP is no answer since it is very much a politico-economical entity, and it is for EU members only. To certain extent Norway and Turkey are in a same group.

The Insider Outsider Dilemma – A Perspective from Sweden
Ms. Jenny Clevström, FOI

The Swedish membership in the EU was a decisive diversion from the neutrality position. Sweden's integration into the European and American security structures deepened in the 90's but in rhetoric the uniqueness of the Swedish position was emphasized. The lack of ability to engage in open and honest discussion about security policy in Sweden has meant that the development in Sweden has been event driven. For example the question of neutrality in Sweden is a non-question – a kind of natural phenomenon. The absence of the political debate among the Swedish elite has kept the Swedish public very ignorant or negative towards the EU identity project. Ms. Clevström worries that, if one shields the public from a real political situation, it could backslash. The reality namely is that a full integration within the EU is an option.

Finally, Ms. Clevström concluded that NATO is the main institution to secure/create peace and security in Europe. Sweden has now positioned itself so that it has no

**Seminar Report: Swedish Atlantic Committée's Youth Organization's
Nordic/Baltic Security Conference in Stockholm, 24-25 April 2004**

influence in NATO. The government of Sweden has argued that being in the EU enhances the possibility to influence whilst being in NATO doesn't. This is not a credible argument, according to Ms. Clevström. Summa summarum, Sweden has an old security conception.

Does neutrality still exist – A perspective from Austria
Ms. Nathalie Vogel, University of Innsbruck

The basic argument of Ms.Vogel is that there is not much left of the Austrian neutrality. There is a general rule which applies well to Austrian politics: "what you see is not what is true, and what is true is very complicated". Austria is not neutral by nature, but needed to become one. Kanzler Figl, the father of Austrian neutrality, managed things so that Austria was seen as the victim of the German aggression. In Austria being neutral means being secure and being secure means being sovereign. Stability is the key word of Austrian politics and consensus is considered very important for crises resistance. Ms. Vogel also argued that the extreme-right Jörg Haider is a product of the Austrian too stability-consensus oriented political life. The Austrian politics has long been analogous to playing chess. You either move, remove or sacrifice. In chess terms the Austrian neutrality has arrived at a pat situation. Can one be half pregnant? Can Austria be partly neutral, partly aligned? Ms.Vogel answer is negative. There is no state in between.

Finally Ms. Vogel described the Austrian politics with the following sentence: the world has changed but Austria doesn't need to. Finally politicians make a virtue of something that has actually become a necessity. In this sense the Austrian political climate seems to have something in common with the Swedish one.

"The Future of YATA"
Mr Troels Egeskovrensen

Nordic/Baltic co-operation is developing: an annual conference tour has been established.

ATA is putting more emphasis on the Youth. For example, Youth has been granted a permanent seat in ATA meetings. As a result, funding of the Youth activities may be easier in the future. Furthermore, this new emphasis may result in a better access to NATO.

YATA executive board has been established to represent the national YATAs on an international level.

During the last twelve months YATA has organized conferences in Belgrad and Georgia and co-operation with these regions (Caucasus, Balkans) should be institutionalised in order to share our knowledge with them.

YATA webpage is finally under construction.

**Seminar Report: Swedish Atlantic Committée's Youth Organization's
Nordic/Baltic Security Conference in Stockholm, 24-25 April 2004**

“US Military Globalised”¹

Dr. Ingemar Dörfer

After the Cold War, the US military has been reviewed four times. Meanwhile, US armed forces have been transformed since e.g. information superiority plays a key role in contemporary warfare. In addition, Bush administration does not see the armed forces as a tool in international social work shaping the environment – as Clinton did. Bush has a different approach. Rumsfeld wants an army that can be send anywhere in the world in ten days and which is capable of beating the enemy in 30 days. As you can see, the cycle is very short.

However, US army code of conduct has nothing to do with peacekeeping or nation-building, which require much longer cycles. Europeans are much more skilled in these tasks. Maybe Americans should create better capabilities in this area of civil service.

Three out of four latest US wars were wars fought by coalitions of the willing (Persian Gulf War, Afghanistan, Iraq War). Only Kosovo was a NATO operation. USA is so much ahead in military capability that allies are not necessary. Transformation of European armies would be very expensive.

In spite of all the differences, Europeans should remember that NATO remains the lingua franca of Western Security co-operation.

“The Future of NATO”

Dr. Mike Winnerstig

NATO is an intergovernmental political alliance with military resources. After all, security guarantees are based on political agreements.

As EU and NATO expand eastwards, the balances of power in these organisations change. However, it is not exactly clear how. The so-called New Europe is likely to increase its influence. NATO is also likely to remain the central organisation for European Security. It is an important vehicle of influence for its member states. The fact that EU/ESDP is still far from being coherent and effective further highlights the importance of NATO.

NATO's and EU's crisis management capabilities will merge in the future. As a result NATO command structure will change profoundly but art. V is – nonetheless – likely to remain important.

¹ for a complete representation you might want to consult Suominen & Kytömaa (eds) “The United States and the World” pp. 47-50. Article in this publication is called “The US Globalised Military”, which kind of reveals the difference between his representations