

Atlantic Council of Finland Youth Network

Euro-Atlantic Perspectives

Vol. 1, No. 2:

“Celebrating the Exchange of Ideas”

The e-Newsletter of the Atlantic Council of Finland Youth Network

Purpose of Euro-Atlantic Perspectives:

The purpose of *Euro-Atlantic Perspectives* is to impart information about Youth Network and ACF activities as well as Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA) and Youth Atlantic Treaty Association (YATA) activities in order that ACF and Youth Network members remain up-to-date on issues affecting transatlantic relations both nationally and internationally. The e-newsletter will help to circulate current ideas about issues that are on the agenda in Euro-Atlantic security and defence policy debates, in the ATA/YATA network, and nationally in Finland.

Besides the educational and informative aspect of the newsletter, it also aims at fostering discussion and debate about current issues influencing transatlantic relations. We hope to touch base on a broad range of topics via think pieces from security specialists, informative articles, event commentary, reviews and opinion pieces.

Newsletter Executive Board:

Mr Matthew Friar, editor (matthew.friar@fulbrightweb.org)

Mr Axel Hagelstam (ahagelst@abo.fi)

Mr Janne Halttu (janne_halttu@hotmail.com)

Ms Karoliina Honkanen (karoliina.honkanen@mil.fi)

Mr Paavo Rantanen (prantan4@welho.com)

Ms Kristiina Rinkineva (kristiina.rinkineva@cmi.fi)

Mr Martti Setälä (masase@utu.fi)

Ms Terhi Suominen (temasu@utu.fi)

Ms Viivi Sydänmäki (viivi.sydanmaki@helsinki.fi)

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Message from the editor:

Dear Readers,

To begin, I must thank the members of the Executive Board for allowing me to continue as acting editor of the newsletter even though I no longer reside in Finland. I enjoy my role and feel that it is an effective way to keep informed about the happenings in the ACF and YATA. I also take pleasure in reading European perspectives regarding transatlantic relations and knowing that the many contributors to our newsletter understand the importance of staying informed, planning activities and constantly finding new ways to express their genuine concern regarding the state of transatlantic relations.

On that note, I believe that prospects for improvements in transatlantic relations look quite good in the long term, but not so great for the immediate future. I base this view on a number of factors. Firstly, despite recent US troop complaints regarding the condition and quantity of armor combined with a harsh decline in the public approval ratings of Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, the Bush Administration continues to stick to its guns by refusing to admit fault, take blame or offer remedy. Secondly, Bush recently awarded the Medal of Freedom – the top US civilian honor – to three men who played integral parts in the formation, execution and administration of his Iraq war strategy. Bush praised all three for advancing liberty and the White House refused to respond to criticism surrounding Bush's choices. Lastly, on a recent visit to Canada, Bush refused to admit that he had made any foreign policy mistakes, instead choosing to deflate Canadian sentiment by stating, "I made some decisions, obviously, that some in Canada didn't agree with, like, for example, removing Saddam Hussein and enforcing the demands of the United Nations Security Council". All of the above examples point to an Administration that is unwilling to accept any critical or honest assessment of its decisions, as such an assessment would no doubt reveal acute weaknesses in the very foundations of Bush's foreign policy. And if the Administration is unable to listen and learn from criticisms, then it will be unable to create the dialogue necessary for negotiation. If the Bush Administration will not "talk" with other countries, then the chances for strengthening transatlantic ties in the next four years remains very low in my opinion.

On a brighter note (for transatlantic relations that is) a recent editorial in the rather conservative *USA Today* newspaper stated: "Growing resistance to reserve call-ups and extended enlistments is exposing how unprepared military planners were for the challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan. Globally, fighting forces are spread painfully thin, severely limiting options if another crisis should arise. And, not surprisingly, recruitment is lagging, particularly in the Guard. That fact raises the specter of mounting shortages." This reality, combined with lagging popularity in the US for the decision to go to war, will force the US at some point to admit that it needs the international community's support. This will in turn lead to a resurgence in support for transatlantic organizations like NATO and the OSCE and a revitalization of the NATO-Russia Council (one the main focuses of this issue). The only downfall is that we may have to wait four more years for a moderate Republican or Democratic President to guide the US back to the table.

I encourage you now to read on and enjoy the intriguing contributions in this issue. Some of the highlights include Colonel Sakari Honkamaa's response to Henrikki Heikka's article in spring

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2004 issue as well as the two insightful articles regarding the NRC – one from Estonia and the other from Russia. This issue also includes exciting insights into the formation of three new YATA chapters in addition to commentary on four international security conferences.

The only contribution that we had hoped to acquire, but never succeeded in obtaining, was an analysis of the recent Finnish White Paper on Security and Defence. Overall, the second newsletter turned out very well and successfully compliments the first. Remember to contact me or Martti Setälä if you are ever interested in contributing or if there is an issue that you believe we should focus on in a later edition. Also, if anyone is interested in the happenings of the Atlantic Council of the United States please visit: <http://www.acus.org/>. Thanks again for your interest and continued patronage.

Matthew L Friar
Editor

1. National Section

1.1 Visions and Challenges for the ACFYN

From Kari Pietilä, President of ACF Youth Network

Dear Readers,

The Youth Network has experienced its first major organizational change. The Youth Network was founded on the eve of year 2003. With the passage of time and the growth of the organization have come various issues that force the ACFYN to check and evaluate its functions. We have founded a board of trustees, which performs all the functions that were earlier delegated mostly to the president alone. The president-centred system caused a very heavy burden of work on one person. Now the responsibilities are divided into six sectors: President, Secretary, Liaisons & Communications, Management, International Affairs and Information Technology. They all are members of the board and in addition there exist local managing directors (Helsinki, Tampere & Turku) who are responsible for planning and performing local functions. The biggest challenge at the moment is to spread the knowledge from the former president to the new board and to delegate responsibilities.

These organizational changes I mentioned were all visualized mainly by the earlier President, Mr Martti Setälä, who has made a remarkable effort to promote the activities of the ACFYN throughout its short, but intense history. The main objective of our activity is the same as the Atlantic Council of Finland: to promote security-political discussion, research and education in Finland. Therefore we have planned these six sectors and entrusted certain responsibilities to each sector. This structural change has increased intra-organisational efficiency and added more insight and perspective to issues at hand.

Our activity can be divided into two major categories: national and international activities. The international element consists primarily of our participation in the YATA network, for example with the NORSEC-workgroup, which is planning and arranging the annual Nordic Region Security Conference in Helsinki for April 2005. This conference is a continuation of earlier conferences in Oslo (2003) and Stockholm (2004). Also, we continue to participate in other international conferences arranged in the YATA/ATA network. Our goal is to be able to send at least one ACFYN delegate to each conference. I believe that there are other ways to contribute to the YATA network and that discussion of new and innovative means should remain high on our list of priorities.

On the national level we have arranged various educational panel discussions with speakers and lecturers of high distinction. Because they are very core of our actions, I desire wholeheartedly to continue these discussions and will persistently work to maintain high standards. I feel it is important to keep these talks open to a large audience; open doors and available seats ensure that anyone who may be interested in issues relevant to transatlantic and European security will be included. This is also one way to spread knowledge of the Youth Network, promote an atmosphere of transparency and actively recruit new members.

To achieve these kinds of goals we must not only maintain contact with our current supporters, but actively seek new contacts with whom we can cooperate with in our shared aims. So far the encouragement from and cooperation with supporters has been more than delightful.

What will the future bring? At the moment the Board has its focus on the three main goals that I mentioned earlier. We continue to spread knowledge of current issues and events to our members. I truly desire to become familiar with the insights and personal visions of all members of the Youth Network. After all, that is one of the main reasons we here! There can exist differences in the issues that are being felt more relevant and of greater importance. So it is important that the Youth Network gives to its members, as well as possible, what the members want from the organization. One must not forget that the organization is also for the members, not only for the cause. And in this issue I hope there is participation from many of our members. I know that there is a massive resource of ideas among the Youth Network, and I would like to see more discussion about the ways we operate.

The organization is still quite young and it is shaping itself at the moment. I believe the goals remain the same, only the ways of achieving them can vary. Currently we have a board of trustees that has not yet had the time to truly demonstrate its capabilities in promoting our action. Fortunately, it is well on its way to doing that and then we will have the tool to make things happen in a larger scale. The board controls and guides our national activity and will continue to strengthen our activities and improve them.

Kari Pietilä

President of the Atlantic Council of Finland Youth Network

1.2 Certain Issues to Re-consider Regarding Finnish Defence

By Colonel Sakari Honkamaa, Defence Staff

In his article *Leave No Neutral Behind* (published in the previous issue of Euro-Atlantic Perspectives) Henrikki Heikka, a researcher at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, suggests that current Finnish defence policy has become rather out-of-date by virtue of its resemblance to Cold War-style defence policy-making. Heikka's portrayal of the Finnish defence and its capabilities as a crippled and an old-fashioned system, the state of which has been remained "a dirty little secret of a few professionals", is far from an analytical and comprehensive understanding of the Finnish defence.

The article written by William Hopkinson, *Sizing and Shaping European Armed Forces*, published by Sipri (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) in March 2004, serves as an incentive for Heikka's analysis. The basic outline of Hopkinson's argument stems from his analysis of the new security environment in which new security threats, such as environmental degradation, organized crime, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction emerge. He argues quite convincingly, but the viewpoint he presents is one of a militarily-allied nation.

Although is not always perfectly clear in Heikka's article which arguments are his and which ones are those of Hopkinson, it seems that Heikka agrees with Hopkinson's views as Heikka

cites Hopkinson's article on numerous occasions. My intention, however, is not to assess Hopkinson's study, but instead to address certain assessments that Heikka has elaborated upon regarding the Finnish defence that in my view are overly pessimistic and partly false.

Despite the fact that we, along with our friends in the transatlantic community, share common security concerns, each individual nation state perceives threats that are unique to its particular geopolitical environment. According to the 2004 Finnish White Paper on Finnish Security and Defence Policy, the crisis and threat scenarios used in Finnish defence planning and preparation are: a regional crisis, political, economic and military pressure and use of military force. The White Paper also outlines the preparedness of the defence forces to respond to asymmetric security threats in co-operation with other authorities.

It is also stated in the White Paper that Finnish defence policy is based on military non-alignment, territorial defence and a common conscription army. It is on these pillars that the national defence leans. Therefore, "Finland's massive reserve" as Hopkinson puts it, responds accordingly to the needs of the Finnish defence doctrine. Strength of defence should not be evaluated by the probability of a threat, but rather by the capacity to respond to it. For a non-allied country, a common conscription army constitutes an important factor in maintaining the credibility of the national defence.

Territorial defence is another outlining factor of the Finnish defence solution and is being developed to correspond to the demands of the next decade. It is through this system that new security threats may also be tackled and new capabilities developed. Furthermore, investments are also being made in information warfare, as the White Paper states. This hardly supports the argument that Finland would be "investing in equipment and doctrine suitable to fight an outdated type of war" as Hopkinson argues.

With a reference to the application of a modern command system, it is well worth mentioning Finnish involvement in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Currently, Finland is in charge of one of the Nato-led multinational KFOR operation in Kosovo. Furthermore, Finland will take command from the United States in the Northern sector of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as the operation is transferred from Nato to the EU. This shows that Finland has not removed herself from the development of military integration. In fact, Finland's contributions to Nato and EU operations are proportionately largest within the transatlantic community.

Finland's involvement in international crisis management operations should not receive negative criticism from the analysts. Finland has demonstrated a clear willingness to participate in the deepening of the European Common Defence and Security Policy in a wide spectrum of tasks. A good example is the Finnish contribution in the European Union Battle Groups concept. Finland participates in the Battle Groups with the Netherlands and Germany as well as Sweden and Norway. This hardly displays evidence of "self-protectionism in peace support operations", but rather a willingness to actively promote the European security perspective. Furthermore, Nato cooperation within the Partnership for Peace Programme is actively maintained.

In my view it appears that Heikka's critique is in fact a critique directed against a national defence solution in which military alignment remains as an option, but not an active policy

outline. The defence solution is a result of a political state of affairs, not an accident. This state of affairs sets certain strict constraints for the development of the defence system as well as capability requirements. Therefore, if one disagrees with the basics of Finland's defence solution, it may be difficult to objectively evaluate our defence capability.

Colonel Sakari Honkamaa

1.3 Update from the ACF Youth Network Branch in Turku, Finland

From Martti Setälä

In Turku in the autumn of 2004 we wanted to focus on the most topical and current issues on our agenda by organizing three discussion events. The first event took place in late August, when we met three young Russian scholars to discuss their country's relations with European and Euro-Atlantic institutions. The second discussion event focused on the new Finnish Security and Defence Policy White Paper that debuted in October. The guest speaker was researcher Dr Arto Nokkala. The third event was organized at the Swedish-speaking University, Åbo Akademi, with Ms Nicola Lindertz from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The debate centered on the political and strategic consequences of Turkey's possible accession to the European Union. Also, some social occasions were organized for more casual and relaxed debate on security and defence policy.

1.4 Forthcoming events

From Martti Setälä

In spring 2005 a major part of our network's energy will be focused on organizing an international YATA conference in Helsinki – the first ever international event in the history of the Finnish YATA chapter! The Nordic/Baltic Region Security Conference 2005 is a part of YATA's strategy to create regional conferences to promote dialogue between youth from different states and to promote understanding of the underlying security environment and challenges faced on a regional level. The first conferences in this series of Nordic/Baltic discussions were organized in Oslo in 2003 and in Stockholm in 2004. The third seminar in the series will focus on the small states' contributions to regional and international security. The event will endure through a whole weekend and more than 50 participants are expected from all Scandinavian and Baltic countries, as well as from other YATA nations. Also broad participation from Finnish YATA members is expected.

In addition, the youth network expects to have local activities in Helsinki, Turku and Tampere. The activities will range from discussion events to seminars. On the national level, the spring excursion will also be organized as well as lots of informal social activities at the local and national levels.

2. International Section

2.1 NATO-Russia Council: Failure or Success Story? – An Estonian Perspective

By Assar Luha (EATA, Estonia)

The NATO-Russia Council was created in Rome two years ago by NATO member states and Russia in order to work as equal partners. The NRC has been a political co-operation framework for consultations, joint decisions and actions. Estonia's NATO membership means that Estonia is one of the allies around the NRC table making decisions.

One might wonder at the role of Estonia in the NRC and its working groups' ability to continue to perform its initial tasks. Several key areas of NRC co-operation are of Estonia's interest in NRC forums and subsidiary working groups, the most promising of them is combating terrorism. Estonia has to make decisions also on non-proliferation, crisis management, logistics, civil emergencies, defence industrial and research, technology co-operation and – most critically- airspace management.

Skeptics may conclude that NRC is a failure or that NRC has already performed its main tasks and has exhausted itself. In *An Open Letter to the Heads of State and Government of the European Union and NATO* in September 2004 EU and NATO intellectual leaders stated: "The leaders of the West must recognize that our current strategy toward Russia is failing." The NRC development seems to follow the same tendency; most of NRC work has been done on a bilateral basis and some of the NRC working groups have ceased to work completely.

NRC has entered a phase in its development where it is necessary to transform the NRC. Although its initial plan was to be more than just a forum for declarations and consultations, open political dialogue has not been as open as expected. One reason might be that the NRC is operating on the principle of consensus. Secondly, Russian diplomacy does have a track record of adhering too rigidly to its claims.

Result-oriented practical co-operation has been more fruitful, like co-operation with Russia in NATO's naval mission in the Mediterranean in the framework of Operation Active Endeavor or co-operation against the threat posed by cross-border organized crime, especially the drug trade from Afghanistan.

Now Russia and NATO have to move on to find a new formula and motivation for co-operation. It is time to create a new and more effective co-operation forum or organization, grounded in the NRC and beneficial for all the parties involved. Next, it would be prudent to offer China and India the same forum offered to Russia and Ukraine years ago. Transatlantic relations must be renewed in light of strategic partnerships with China and India.

Is there a future for the NATO Russia Council?

In the Istanbul Summit Communiqué it was stated that NRC has heightened the quality of the relationship between the Alliance and Russia. NATO is ready to broaden political dialogue and

committed to deepening consultations with Russia on key security issues including Afghanistan, the Balkans, the fight against terrorism and non-proliferation of WMD.

If NRC maintains its current shape new challenges will continually lie in waiting. A sensible way intensify NRC co-operation in the struggle against terrorism would be to utilize the NRC to encourage Russia to involve itself in active conflict management as it is now in Afghanistan and probably will be in Iraq.

Does mistrust inhibit Estonia's active involvement in NRC?

While the Estonian vision may be to help and advise NATO to involve Russia in practical and meaningful co-operation, it is often penetrated by the mistrust of several Estonian generations.

Estonia has to be realistic and to contribute actively towards the creation of a positive NRC agenda. Estonia must explain states' positions bilaterally to the allies and be ready to act on a case-by-case basis if necessary. Estonia has to be especially active in solving questions related directly to Estonia's interests as well as the interests of the Alliance as a whole - particularly violations of the Estonian airspace and the CFE treaty.

NRC may turn out to be a success story. The success of the NRC depends on the success of NATO and Russia and vice versa, and Estonia certainly has its role to play in this story as well as other Allies.

Assar Luha
Estonian Atlantic Treaty Association

2.2 The NATO-Russia Council in the context of Russia-Western Relations: From Insufficient to Precious

By Dmitry V. Suslov (CFDP, Russia)

The first thing one should keep in mind while talking about the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) is that it is indigenously not exactly what Russia was aspiring and struggling for in Autumn 2001 when this idea initially appeared. The NRC was officially proposed by British Prime Minister Tony Blair. He suggested that given the new security situation after the tragic events of September 11, intensive Russia-US cooperation in the struggle against terrorism, Russia's support of the US operation in Afghanistan and the decision of President Putin to allow the US troops to relocate to Central Asia, it was logical and desirable to raise the level and intensity of Russia-NATO relations. However, in reality the idea was presented by Moscow, which then persuaded Blair (at that time Putin's closest friend in Europe) to propose it. And the goal Russia was pursuing was not just an increase in cooperation with NATO in the anti-terror field, but integration into the decision-making system of the West in the sphere of "hard" security.

Russia's purpose was indeed to "enter NATO from the back door" – to get integrated into the NATO and NATO-centric decision-making system without becoming a formal member of the Alliance. By doing so Moscow was not trying to ruin the organization from the inside, as the US "neo-conservatives" and the new NATO members from the Central and Eastern Europe warned,

but to act as a normal part of the Euro-Atlantic community. Indeed, the period from autumn 2001 to summer-autumn of 2002 was a “golden era” for Russia-Western cooperation; Mr. Putin was seriously considering rejecting the option to build Russia’s own “pole” out of the CIS and instead considering a genuine bid to enter the West. Unfortunately, this chance was not used, because of both Russian and Western shortsightedness. Thus, in 2001 Russia’s (Britain’s) approach was to opt for the new NATO-Russia Council and decision-making over all cases and issues not covered by Article V of the Washington Treaty. Thus, the old NATO Council - where Russia is not represented - was considered to decide only those issues related to common defense.

This idea did not work out. It was severely attacked by the US (primarily the Defense Department, Office of the Vice-President and the National Security Council), and even more passionately by the Central and Eastern European members and the Baltic States, which were not pleased to observe Moscow participating in the forum they were entering in order to run away from Moscow. The main “battle” took place on December 5-6, 2001. This was anticipated by the Russian side and was the main reason for Russian opposition of the second round of NATO enlargement (Russian original opposition to the Baltic States joining the NRC). Obviously, this produced the opposite result and only weakened Russia’s stance in NATO.

As a result, in May 2002 the NRC emerged in its present design – with a very limited agenda not even approaching the anticipated level of joint decision-making on fundamental political and hard security issues and problems of European and global security. Of course there *is* a NRC agenda, which includes the tasks of intelligence-sharing, rescue operations, non-proliferation issues, fighting terrorism, cooperation over Afghanistan and even “tactical” anti-ballistic missile systems, but this agenda is rather fragmented and focuses on entirely practical and technical issues, bypassing strategic decision-making. The scale of cooperation in the NRC does not correspond to the size of the “new threats” of terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Islamic fundamentalism, regional instability, state failure, collapse of the Broader Middle East, etc.

Moreover, any the NATO member state can block discussion of any question posed in the NRC if it deems discussion inappropriate for any arbitrary reason. This factor alone suggests that it is very unlikely that the NRC agenda and the scope will be increased in the near future; Poland, the Baltic States and the US, whose foreign policy elaboration will totally be dominated by the neo-conservatives in the second Bush Administration, will certainly block any effort at Council efficacy. Since creation, there have been no precedents of the NRC moving beyond the initial agenda.

Definitely, the NRC was a good step forward and a progressive alternative to the previous Permanent Cooperation Council. At the NRC Russia is participating in the deliberation, decision-making and implementation of decisions on all agenda issues on an equal basis with other NATO members. While in the PCC, Russia and NATO met only when decisions had already been adopted by the both sides separately, and thus it was very difficult for Moscow to alter any decision already taken by the then 19-member Alliance. Russia had to either agree or be expelled. Secondly, NRC is a good sign of Russia-NATO rapprochement after the Kosovo crisis of 1999 and symbolizes a fresh start in relations. But the NRC is vividly inefficient, taking into account the fact that the Cold War ended 15 years ago - not yesterday.

Having said all that I will now stress my main thesis, which is that paradoxically, the NRC with all its weak points is the best Russia can expect under current international circumstances. Besides, it is the ideal format for Russia-NATO relations in short-term prospects, and both sides should do their best to keep it intact. There are reasons for both NATO and Russia to do so.

On the NATO side the main reason is the role the Alliance plays in global decision-making. When the NRC was being created, this role was different from the current one. There was a widespread impression that the Alliance was gradually becoming the basic decision-making body for hard security issues, thus bypassing the UN. It seemed likely that NATO would become the main institution dealing with hard security not only in the Euro-Atlantic area, but in the world. Thus, participating in NATO was viewed by many as a means to be involved in this emerging decision-making system and thus to be involved in the heart of global governance. Russia was not an exception here.

However, very soon it became evident that these calculations were false. The war in Iraq was a major turning point here. The role of NATO as a global decision-making body declined drastically together with the vitality of Europe for the US in managing the Broader Middle East. Together with the role of NATO, Russian interests in becoming integrated in the Alliance's decision-making also declined. Moscow was searching for other tools to increase its role in global decision-making. These tools were a search for a "new strategic partnership" with the US, attempts at creating an alliance with France and Germany (the coalition of the "unwilling") and an effort to stop the break-up of the post-Soviet space as a single geopolitical Russia-centric unit and construct its own "global polar" out of the CIS, etc. Despite the fact that all these projects failed, the truth is that Russia turned away from NATO just as the organization's strategic decline began.

Nevertheless, NATO continues to play a vital role in the European security and even in global governance. It keeps the US in Europe, both politically and militarily, and indeed keeps the US from exercising unreserved unilateralism and forces it to pay heed to its global responsibilities. The Alliance is a valuable source for the member states' "recruitment" for coalitions of the willing. Besides, NATO provides these coalitions with the valuable members, those who really have the military, economic, political and institutional (in terms of culture of cooperation) capacity to contribute to any given operation. Finally, given the current failure of the neo-conservative ideology in the US, which is vivid despite the Bush reelection and internal shifts in the Administration, and given the disastrous situation in Iraq, the role of NATO in world diplomacy and international security decision-making may well rise again. The Alliance's direct involvement in Iraq is rather probable in the next year or two. In this case one should expect a rebirth of Russian interest in NATO as a decision-making body. And for this option it is necessary to preserve the NRC not just as talking shop, but in spirit as well - a successful forum, beneficial for both sides and open to the real possibility of intensifying and "upgrading" the Council in the future, of broadening its agenda and increasing its share in decision-making for the Euro-Atlantic area. The only way of keeping this possibility is to cooperate meaningfully on the current agenda.

On the Russian side there exist even more factors in favor of keeping the current format of Russia-NATO cooperation, even without attempts at immediate intensification. During the 2.5 years that have passed since creation of the NRC, it has become evident that the vector of Russia's domestic development is turning more and more in a direction very different from that of the US and Europe. Relevant changes are taking place in Russian foreign policy. It seems that

the Putin Administration has rejected the previous goal of joining Western institutions and integrating into the Euro-Atlantic community. On the contrary, the Kremlin is intensifying its struggle for the CIS and striving to preserve its “sphere of influence” in those territories, which it ultimately hopes will amount to the reestablishment of a “polar” or a multipolar world.

Moscow’s approach to relations with NATO and the EU, the vision of Eurasia is again bipolar. Russia, of course, is not rejecting cooperation with these institutions, but wishes to make it cooperation between the two blocks – Russia-centric and the Western ones. The situation resembles the late 80s, when hostility between NATO and the Warsaw Pact was coming to the end, but they still acted as two strictly divided blocks. A similar pattern is pushed by Russia nowadays. In the Kremlin’s view, the security structure of Eurasia is to be designed by NATO and the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization), while economic structure - via cooperation of “two greatest integrationist blocks of the Continent” – by the EU and the CIS. Thus, despite its absolute inconsistency with logic and reality, Moscow is turning towards viewing the NRC as an instrument of cooperation between the two blocks – NATO and the CSTO.

The reasons for this approach, which inevitably push Russia further away from the Euro-Atlantic community and therefore from the democratic world and European and global decision-making, are twofold. Firstly, it is that Moscow failed to achieve a “breakthrough” in its relations with the West and get fully integrated into the Western decision-making system without actually becoming a part of the West in terms of norms and standards. The second reason is Russia’s domestic development and escalation of authoritarian trends. In order to preserve and prolong the regime, and thus continue multiplying their economic benefits, the corrupt, inefficient, semi-criminal and Byzantine Russian “nomenklatura”, again powerful after 13 years since the collapse of the USSR and the Communist system, is pushing Russia into confrontation with the West. Some would say a “Cool War” now exists between Russia and the US/EU – and the effects are pushing Moscow into international isolation. Russia’s appearance at the December OSCE summit in Sofia, President Putin’s statements in India about opposition to unipolarity and hegemony, rhetorical and doomed for failure attempts to arrange some “strategic axis” and the crisis in Ukraine and Russia’s reaction to it all function as factual evidence which strengthen this thesis.

Paradoxically, just several years ago, but as a result of this “Cool War” with the US and the EU, Moscow’s relations with NATO are much better and far less confrontational and painful for Russia, than its relations with the US, EU and OSCE. This would have been totally unthinkable just a couple of years ago. As a result of Moscow’s deepening international isolation from the West the Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs is already speaking of NATO-Russia relations, not the OSCE, as the “corner stone” of the European security.

In these severe circumstances it would be wise not to demand more, but instead to keep the NRC as it is, focusing on practical aspects and technical operations where the interests of the sides clearly converge, and avoiding difficult political and strategic issues. Focusing on the latter would paralyze the Council immediately and contribute to Russia’s isolation from the Euro-Atlantic community.

Dmitry V. Suslov

Deputy Director for Research at the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy, Russia

2.3 Messages from national YATA chapters

2.3.1 BEAY – Belgian Euro-Atlantic Youth – is launched!

By Charlotte Peters, BEAY

In March this year the General Assembly of the Euro-Atlantic Association of Belgium decided that after years without activity, the youth work should be taken up again. Therefore they designated Francis Costenoble, young member of the administrative board, as president of the much-anticipated youth section.

Following this decision Francis initiated an introductory project together with 10 students from the Catholic University of Leuven (KUL), which consisted of gathering information on all important international or national political institutions and organisations with seats in Brussels or Belgium to be listed on a new website. This website, now under construction and soon to be available, is intended for young people looking for information regarding internship possibilities, study programs, documentation for papers, etc.

The students participating in this project, however, were not interested in further involvement with the association once their preliminary work was done, and so Francis was left alone. Only at the end of August he was joined by me, who had recently returned from Istanbul with an abundance of new contacts and a desire to carry forth the stimulating experience I-PASS had been for me.

Together Francis and I started brainstorming about what we could do to launch activities and who we could contact to acquire new members. We first developed the idea of enlarging the website - once it is online - to a discussion forum, which would include an area devoted to the publishing of articles gathered from different countries that present differing or converging opinions or analyses on particular issues. On these same subjects we also want to organise small conferences/debates for a young public in Brussels.

When we started to look for potential members we were confronted with a problem: most people we contacted responded positively, but were not prepared to dedicate much time or energy to such projects. Figuring that we needed to start a somewhat broader publicity campaign in Brussels, we undertook - as well as was possible with two active members (one occupied with a full-time job) – to purposefully promote our chapter. The response was, as we feared, quite mediocre, with very few people showing up for the recruitment meeting and even fewer for the subsequent meeting. Resolute, we redoubled efforts to contact people we knew directly and through our associates - people we trusted to have energy, motivation, and previous experience in youth organisations. This eventually paid off, as we are now six members strong and ready to start practical work as soon as the organisational work concerning the constitution of the association and the allocation of responsibilities has been finished.

Regarding organisational matters, the question of the statutes to be adopted remains open for the time being; the Euro-Atlantic Association of Belgium has uttered its wish to keep us as one of their sections, whereas we had initially been discussing the creation of an independent

association - which would have had a bond only of friendship and mutual support with the Euro-Atlantic Association, and not one of dependence. The advantages of staying within the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Association are clear of course; on one hand there is the attractiveness their financial support, which would perhaps be less securable to an independent youth association. But on the other hand, creating an association in its own right with democratic statutes and procedures would give the members an altogether different sense of responsibility and ambition.

Discussion with other youth chapters and the members of the YATA executive board in Rome will certainly help us analyse these and other questions more extensively, as Troels Sorensen and members from other YATA's, especially Esther Rozenkier and Agnès de Cornulier from the new French YATA, have already done. The important fact now is that we are up and running and that you will certainly hear more from us in the future.

Charlotte Peters
Founding Member, Belgian Euro-Atlantic Youth

2.3.2 The Birth of YATA France

By Esther Rozenkier

Sunday, the 21st of November, 2004 YATA France was born. A total of nine members have voted to create new association and its bureau. Esther Rozenkier was elected President. Marie-Astrid Bethenod, Agnès de Cornulier, Olivier Levard and Pierre-Olivier Pin were elected members of the bureau.

Although YATA France came to life officially on this day of November, the organization has been living in our minds for quite a long time now. The real birth date of this new branch of YATA probably dates back to the I-PASS summit in Istanbul last June.

Thanks to Troels Sorensen, President of YATA International, a French delegation was created only a few days before the summit and was sent to Istanbul. The experience of I-PASS has been very important to this delegation, not only because we have met other French students within our delegation with a strong taste for international relations and security issues, but especially because we were all surprised by the warm relations we established with other participants almost instantly upon our arrival. Students from many countries came to us in a very friendly way to talk about France, our culture, our language, our diplomacy, and also about their countries and the way they were perceived in France. While it would be useless to list all these signs of interest, delegates from Croatia, Germany, Spain, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Belgium, U.K. have made this summit particularly important to us.

After the valuable exchanges we made with them, we felt that we had to find a means of perpetuating these relations through an association. Meetings with Troels Froeling and Troels Sorensen in Istanbul, both of them being very supportive, convinced us we had a “window of opportunity” for creating a YATA organization in France. Informal exchanges with Jean Fournet and Stefanie Babst from NATO were also very encouraging.

Back in Paris, we were more than convinced that a French YATA was necessary. The questions that remained in regards to establishing a new organization were those of legitimacy and the range of events/activities YATA France should get involved in. Because we were neither specialized in security issues nor interested only by these subjects, we soon decided the association should cover a wider range of subjects. Another point was to involve students and working young people that were not only from Sciences Po (a well-known French university most I-PASS French delegates were from).

On this basis, we have defined YATA France as an organization that aims at a broad audience. The mission of YATA France is to inform the youth on transatlantic and European issues, but also to favour friendship and a better understanding between the youth of NATO countries and other European countries. The following are the first events and projects we are proud to present:

A meeting with Troels FROLING in Paris on December 8th, 2004

Our very first event is a meeting with Troels FROELING, Secretary General of ATA, an early supporter of YATA France. Our President Esther Rozenkier will present our association and our friends from UK and Belgium will be with us as a mark of support.

Website

YATA France will launch an ambitious website as soon as it is financially feasible, which will include a database on transatlantic issues (in French and English) as well as a forum.

Simulation

We will sponsor a NATO simulation for French students next April and a conference on French "laïcité". Partnerships with Moldavia, UK and Ukraine are already on track. You will be the first to know when dates are chosen! Please contact us if you are interested:
yata_france@yahoogroupes.fr

Esther Rozenkier
President, YATA France

2.3.3 Constructing YACUK – the Young Atlantic Council of the UK

By Natasha Kocsis

The Young Atlantic Council was formed in summer 2004 by a group of young people as part of the Atlantic Council of the United Kingdom.

Building on NATO's 55 years of successful and peaceful relations between members of alliance, the Young Atlantic Council of the United Kingdom (YACUK) is the premier forum for young people of various backgrounds to get involved in discussion and debate with current and future decision makers within and beyond the alliance. Our aim is to engage young people in defence and security issues, to encourage their active participation in debates and to raise the profile and level of knowledge and understanding of defence and wider security issues amongst the young generation. We would also like to create opportunities for young people, including university

students, young professionals and others, on national and international level, to network and learn about international politics while being exposed to activities such as simulations, seminars, and international debates.

However, the future of the Alliance hinges on public and political perceptions. For the young people of today, for whom the Cold War is either a hazy recollection or merely a part of history class, it is important that NATO demonstrates its ability to change and adapt to modern challenges.

YACUK represents the views of young people and encourages engagement of young people in wider defence and international security forums. We wish to generate ideas and informed debates about international politics, defence matters, and international security issues amongst the future decision makers in the United Kingdom. Admittedly, issues such as terrorism are not the only security issue that societies face. Other threats such as organised crime and cyber crime are also of major concern to civil society. For youth in particular, drug and gang related difficulties can often have far more relevance to everyday life than the possibility of a “dirty bomb” being let off in a crowded place. It is therefore not an easy task to raise the awareness of young people in regards to international security threats.

One method to inform and involve young people in these issues is through schools. Lessons in citizenship and general studies periods would provide a discussion forum on all threats that affect the lives of young people, from drugs and bullying to the greater concerns, including that of terrorism. In aiding discussion on these terrorist issues, NATO and YATA could provide help and information. Indeed, in many schools such lessons are perhaps already running, and information provided by NATO is possibly used and welcomed. Outside speakers could continue to visit to talk about NATO’s work, much as they have done in the past.

Such lessons would certainly inform young people about security issues. The difficulty is that becoming actively involved would appeal only to a certain portion of the youth population, in general those already part of, or at least taking an interest in the general political aspects. However, a discussion rather than a lecture would be more likely to involve as well as inform younger people and would possibly let students develop an interest in the issues that they will want to take further.

Therefore, our objective is to generate ideas and informed debates about international politics, defence matters and international security issues amongst the future decision makers in the United Kingdom and to develop greater interest amongst young people and to enhance their participation in issues pertaining to the goals and objectives of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

Natasha Kocsis
Chair of YACUK

2.4 Comments on International Conferences/Seminars:

2.4.1 NATO in the Run-Up to Istanbul – EATA – June 3-5, 2004

By Matthew Friar (ACF, Finland)

“NATO in the Run-Up to Istanbul” was a thought-provoking and informative educational experience that featured a wide variety topics and speakers from Estonia, Sweden, Russia, Croatia, Denmark, the US and others. Topics ranged from identifying prominent threats in the Baltic Region to the dangers of radical Islamism. Participants asked a number of rousing questions, posed intriguing hypotheticals and shared their aspirations for world diplomacy.

Some of the more stimulating discussion revolved around defining “success” and “goals” in Afghanistan given that the population is war-weary and regional warlords are refusing to give up their power and arms. Different speakers offered very different perspectives on Afghanistan; Mr. Jean Fournet, NATO Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy, offered a very optimistic view, noting that Kabul is stable, soldiers are being trained, disarmament is occurring and the number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams operating outside of Kabul is growing. General Ole Martin Hojem, Assistant Chief of Staff, NATO Civil Military Cooperation, offered a very bleak perspective, lamenting that he was “not optimistic” about Afghanistan or current developments there as the country was segmented into ethnic groups and presided over by warlords.

Opinions about the approaching Istanbul Summit and NATO’s Reaction Force (NRF) also widely differed; Mr. Jean Fournet spoke of Istanbul Summit as an excellent way to explain NATO’s agenda to the public and to build support for NATO’s agenda nationally. Dr. Giovanni Gasparini, Research Fellow, Istituto Affari Internazionali, on the other hand, stated that the Istanbul summit was “not focused on the right issues,” NATO’s traditional military approach is unsuitable to today’s global threats, and that NATO should refocus on what it can do better - military intervention on the “high-end section”, planning, rules and leadership.

Regarding the NRF, Mr Fournet touted the Force as a deployable, sustainable, usable and credible way to deal with counterterrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) issues. A few hours later, Prof. Dr. Michael Mihalka of the College of International and Security Studies, Germany, handed out a draft copy of his latest article, which highlighted the various political constraints and lack of political will that marked NATO’s decision-making process. His conclusion was basically that the NRF would neither be rapid, deployable or much of a force.

The final divide in opinion I will note is that of negotiations with Russia. During the discussion, Ambassador Toomas Hendrik Ilves, MEP and former Foreign Minister of Estonia defined “Russian political meddling” as one of the greatest threats to Baltic stability. When a member of the audience inquired about engaging Russia via dialogue, he responded by noting that we have heard about the need to “engage” Russia for 14 years, but that “talking shop” simply has not worked. In contrast, Mr. Timofei Bordachev, Director of Studies of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy and Deputy Editor of *Russia in Global Affairs* asserted that Russia would one day apply for both EU and NATO membership. He stated with enthusiasm that Russia is

demonstrating its commitment to democracy via the opening up its markets and emphasis on free trade.

These are just a few of the scenarios that led the audience to ponder, consider and discuss the austere analyses of the many participants. This conference was marked by a remarkable element of openness, sincerity and candor. The organizers should be proud.

2.4.2 Istanbul Pan-Atlantic Student Summit, I-PASS June 28-30, 2004

By Eero Kytömaa (CMI, Finland)

For the second time in the history of NATO, students from the Euro-Atlantic area were invited to participate in the official NATO Summit. In 2002 students attended the NATO summit in Prague. Two years later 204 students from 37 countries discussed the future of the Alliance and contemporary security issues during the NATO Summit in Istanbul. Students had the possibility to discuss with the numerous policymakers, including NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, U.S Secretary of State Colin Powell and the Prime Minister of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

The Koc University's beautiful campus at the outskirts of the city of Istanbul was the main place for the decision-making simulation. The simulation gave two very distinct tasks to 37 delegations, which all had their representatives in the NAC, the political committee and the military committee.

The first task was aimed at developing participants' negotiation skills; students had to draft new guidelines for NATO's out-of-area operations in a consensus manner with 37 member states. The second task was to deal with a sudden crisis situation in the fictitious nation of Corona. The simulation had one very distinctive feature: the previous players had been NATO Defence Ministers at the official Colorado Springs meeting in 2003, where Allied Command Transformation wanted to test ministers' decision-making skills in a surprise event. Delegates from ACT were also present at the Koc University to observe how students would deal the unfolding events.

In all levels of simulation, there were heated debates about policies and strategies, which could be acceptable to every delegation. In the end, students managed to solve both challenging tasks. The solution to the Corona crisis was to consent through the silence procedure to deploy troops on the ground and to change the operation to a peacekeeping mission after the fighting phase was over. The political committee did the main job in drafting the new out-of-area communiqué. The delegates did not reach consensus in all points. Hence, some of the paragraphs are still in brackets in the communiqué¹. Does this sound like a typical NATO decision-making? Yes, slow and difficult, but through consensus the solution can be found.

Eero Kytömaa
Project assistant at Crisis Management Initiative, Finland
Member of the ACFYN

¹ The entire Communiqué is located on the last pages of this newsletter.

2.4.3 The 19th Danish Atlantic Youth Seminar in Denmark, Ålborg 6-12.7.2004

By Viivi Sydänmäki (ACF, Finland)

DAYS (Danish Atlantic Youth Seminar) is a seminar of one week's duration with approximately 50 young participants from all over Europe and North America. It is held every summer in Jutland in Denmark. The first DAYS was held in 1986. The seminar is organized jointly by staff at the Secretariat of the Danish Atlantic Treaty Association (DATA) and volunteering members of the Youth Committee. The Danish Atlantic Treaty Association carries out both national and international activities, such as holding international and national conferences, youth seminars, meetings and debates, publishing books, folders and articles, and participating in meetings, conferences and youth seminars abroad. The Youth Committee participants make preparations and carry out their staff job on a voluntary basis, finding it important to spend their time in NGO work engaging young people in social and political participation. This year the topic of the seminar was "Conflict and Democratization: Consequences and Challenges".

The programme of DAYS consisted of a mixture of lectures, workshops, debates, the Peace and Conflict Game, excursions and social gatherings. The overall goal of the seminar was to discuss and debate issues concerning European, global and international security. During DAYS we talked about security policy in general, international cultural conflicts and coexistence, the EU's draft constitution, NATO's military interventions from Kosovo to Iraq, EU-Russia-NATO relations and democratization in Iraq- just to name a few. The lecturers came from the Danish Industry, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, NATO HQ, several universities such as LSE, the Centre for Defence Information (Moscow), the American Embassy in Denmark, the Danish Institute of International Affairs and the Centre for Transatlantic Relations (Washington).

The participants came from around the world: Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and USA. I enthusiastically recommend this seminar to anyone who is interested in international relations and security policy. It was an enjoyable social happening and outstanding educational seminar.

Viivi Sydänmäki
Member of the ACFYN

2.4.4 International Youth Seminar arranged by HYAC

Facing New Challenges: International Responses to Global Terrorism

Budapest, August 29-31, 2004

By Kari Pietilä (ACF, Finland)

The seminar was short, but very intense and the substance was of high academic level. The lectures and discussion varied from the definition of terrorism to the reaction of the people after the March 11, 2004 Madrid bombings.

The definition of terrorism came out as the most troublesome topic in the seminar; technically, there exist more than hundred different definitions of terrorism. More than one lecturer gave us

insights into this problematic situation, one which is not only complex to academics, but to diplomats and politicians alike. Differences in regards to perception of acts of terrorism are most pronounced across the Atlantic Ocean. The reaction in the United States in 2001 was quite different from the reaction of Spain and the EU in 2004; in the US terrorism is viewed as a national security issue, but in Europe it is seen as criminal activity.

Lecturers tried to explain the differences through a cultural and historical lens. They asked a number of intriguing questions: Why did Europe not react in the same manner as the US? Was it the fact that 9/11 was shown live on television all over the world and the destruction was so devastating? After all, 9/11 was certainly not the first bomb attack in the US. In Madrid, the ETA was blamed directly after the bombings and people stormed furiously into the streets. We discussed of this in small workgroups, where we focused on examining the good and bad sides of using soft and hard power in fighting terrorism. It was quite difficult to decide which method worked better. Our conclusion was that both methods should be employed, but with careful consideration of the time, place and context.

One of the participants happened to be living in Madrid at the time of the terror strikes. Participants had a chance to witness photos of the people's reaction in the same day of the bombings. This was something that one certainly does not get see everyday! Peoples' faces and the general atmosphere in the pictures were straight out of a horror movie; women and men in front of the city hall, shouting and carrying sheets with written opinions. Everybody looked either angry or grief stricken, but not towards one person or group, but because of the act itself. Their faces asked: *who could do such a thing and why?* I believe this these expressions were a clue, and insight into terrorist motives. Terrorists desire to destroy – via fear and insecurity - peoples' trust and confidence in their leaders' ability to protect them. They yearn to persuade their 'enemy' to change leaders in hopes of changing the actions of their government in a way that better suits the leadership terrorist networks.

The use of official organisations to thwart the intentions of global terrorist networks was found to be problematic. Some organisations are viewed as inefficient, and others are not very useful in particular situations. NATO, on the other hand, can be used to effectively uncover terrorist training camps and larger terrorist networks hiding in areas that traditional armed forces could not operate in without endangering civilians. The trouble is that military operations are seen as removing some of the terrorists, but not the root causes of terrorism. The UN works through soft values, supporting the welfare of the people, but UN programmes often take multiple years and rely on the sovereign consent of states involved. The EU is also working through humanitarian support and diplomatic discussion. But the trouble once again is that terrorists do not negotiate diplomatically via official representatives.

The outcome of the seminar was a success; it was very educational to those who were not previously familiar with the multiple conceptions and perceptions of terrorism which span the Atlantic. We thoroughly enjoyed the opportunity to discuss with the presenters themselves. Through our connection with the US Embassy in Finland, we successfully created a transatlantic link with two US presenters during the lecture from the United States Naval Academy.

2.5 Update and information on future e-newsletter publication

Euro-Atlantic Perspectives will be published again in the spring/summer of 2005. Please contact Matthew Friar (matthew.friar@fulbrightweb.org) or Martti Setälä (masase@utu.fi) if you are interested in submitting an article, update or comment.

2.6 Student Summit Communiqué from I-PASS

Issued by the future Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the North Atlantic Alliance
Who participated in the model meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the Istanbul Pan-Atlantic Student Summit, 28-30 June, 2004.

1. We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, met today to reaffirm our common commitment to the Alliance and further strengthen NATO to meet the grave new threats and profound security challenges of the 21st century. Bound by our common vision embodied in the Washington Treaty, we commit ourselves to facing the new developing and rapidly changing threats of today. The 37 nations of NATO are steadfast in our commitment to the transatlantic link; to NATO's fundamental security tasks including collective defence; to our shared democratic values; and to the United Nations Charter.
2. The members of NATO recognise that the Alliance faces a wide range of threats that call for different approaches. The Atlantic Alliance measures the seriousness of a threat on the basis of established facts that assess the immediacy and expected consequences. The Alliance reserves the right to act outside of its borders according to the United Nations Charter if these threats are determined to be of a substantial danger to the security of the Alliance.
3. The threats to the Alliance which may justify such actions may include, but are not limited to:
. Transnational terrorism that affects the security of the Alliance
The proliferation, threat, or actual use of weapons of mass destruction
Regional conflicts, including ethnic cleansing and genocide
Failed states, especially upon the incapacity of the native government to exercise its responsibility to protect its people and ensure regional stability.
Systemic threats, such as cyber terrorism, humanitarian catastrophes, trafficking of human beings, and small arms, and serious human rights violations
4. Diplomacy and formal dialogue should be exercised and exhausted before NATO acts. [Where United Nations Security Council or national governments choose not to exercise their authority and responsibility to resolve such situations, this shall not preclude NATO from action.]
5. The members of the Alliance recognize that instability outside of our members' borders can create environments that affect NATO members, allowing for the development and proliferation of the threats cited in this communiqué.
6. These operations would take place only after the situation has been identified by the United Nations, as one that could potentially require some form of military, peacekeeping, or security involvement. In the framework of international law, we will continue dialogue and cooperation on a case-by-case basis with United Nations and regional organisations.
7. [NATO recognises the United Nations Security Council as the primary body for maintaining international peace and security in accordance with the United Nations Charter, and that NATO should always make all possible effort to get a mandate from the United Nations Security Council.]
8. The NATO member states agree that permanent structures are better and more reliable than ad-hoc alliances for dealing with international security issues. NATO member states also believe that a decision concerning out-of-area operations has to be based on the political consensus of all NATO member states.
9. As far as the legal framework of NATO out-of-area operations is concerned, such operations will take place in accordance with international law.
10. Alliance members recognise that, in exceptional cases, it may be necessary to engage in rapid and decisive operations. Dealing with very urgent situations, we understand that we cannot ignore events that threaten

the security of NATO members. Therefore we will always look for the appropriate solution to serve the fundamental security of NATO members in the quickest possible way.

11. NATO will consider action in any situation in accordance with the following criteria:

- In the case of specific human rights violations. In accordance with longstanding principles of international law and based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in clear cases of genocide and ethnic cleansing, NATO member states are required to make all efforts to end such human rights violations. Other exceptional cases can be dealt with on a case-by-case basis by consensus.

- When all other efforts are exhausted. Diplomacy and formal dialogue should be exercised and exhausted before NATO will act.

- Incapacity of local government. In the event of a failed state, or a state which has failed to exercise its responsibility to protect its people and ensure regional stability, NATO may choose to intervene, in accordance with international law.

- To prevent the spread of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction

- To fight terrorism where there is a threat to regional security and/or when terrorist action can be taken against NATO member states.

- In clear cases of proliferation, imminent threat of use or actual use of chemical biological, nuclear, or radiological weapons that could lead to regional insecurity, NATO will act in accordance with international law.

This shall be done in full cooperation and dialogue with international organisations, primarily the United Nations.

12. The objectives of intervention are:

- To end violence.

- To provide a force to facilitate further stabilisation in the area of operation and to maintain security while stabilisation occurs.

13. The force used to resolve a conflict must be proportional to the threats.

14. NATO shall always act with legitimacy as based on the Washington Charter and United Nations Security Council resolutions. [If the United Nations Security Council chooses not to reach a decision and the fundamental security interests of one or more NATO-member states are threatened, NATO can decide to engage in out-of-area operation in accordance with the provisions of this communiqué.]

15. NATO shall contribute to all operations necessary to insure the security of its members according to NATO's definition of threats. NATO will consider the following out-of-area operations: conflict prevention, conflict management, peacekeeping, stabilization missions, non-combat evacuations, disaster management, humanitarian crisis management, counter terrorism and high intensity combat, and demonstrative use of force.

16. NATO's armament activities must meet the Alliance's evolving military needs. We therefore reaffirm the importance we attach to mutually advantageous transatlantic defence industrial cooperation. This includes strengthening NATO's ties with the European defence industry. Focus should be on technology within the areas of information sharing and joint combined intelligence operations and training, air and sea transport capabilities, communications technology development, special operations and response capacity to civil and military crises, especially against the threat of unconventional weapons.

17. NATO must address its collective capacity to provide for a defensive response standard operating procedure for asymmetrical threats specifically on the European continent.

18. The question of funding NATO out-of-area operations will be addressed at the upcoming meeting of NATO Ministers of Defence in Madrid in October, 2007.

19. It is important that the Alliance maintain strong and cordial relationships with international and regional organisations because often these organisations are the most able to contribute substantial resources to out-of-area operations.

20. NATO recognizes the importance of the United Nations and its associated bodies and recognizes the United Nations as the primary governing authority in international law. NATO members appreciate the efforts of the United Nations in working for stability and working for security around the world. NATO is committed to further developing the relationship between NATO and the United Nations to address the threats that have been identified in this communiqué.

21. The Alliance is committed to working closely with the European Union, our vital and important ally. The Alliance recognizes the unique role of the European Union and its strong capability through the European Security and Defence Policy to deal with issues such as conflict management and resolution, in conjunction, and without duplication, with NATO.

22. To further promote peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic Area, NATO will continue to develop its fruitful and close cooperation with the OSCE, namely in the complementary areas of conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation.

23. The Alliance will develop closer relationships with other regional organisations that may want to contribute to potential out-of-area operations. These may include organisations such as the African Union, the Arab League, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Caribbean Community, Commonwealth of Independent States, the Economic Community of West African States, the Inter-governmental Authority on Government, and the Organisation of American States.

24. NATO believes that strong regional organisations can help promote stability and security. Therefore, it is in the interests of the Alliance to provide assistance, where possible.

25. The Alliance recognises the growing importance of non-governmental organisations in the development of peace and stability. We therefore commit to investigating methods for involving NGOs in the planning and implementation of out-of-area operations, as they are often a source of information and expertise that is not directly available to NATO.

26. We recognize the need to institutionalise the Alliance's cooperation with the Peoples' Republic of China. Both parties have already expressed the aspiration to interact as equal partners in many areas of common interest, including the struggle against terrorism and in areas of crisis management. Therefore, we express our determination to engage in intensified negotiations with China. The aim of negotiations is to establish a NATO-China Council before the next NATO Summit in 2009.

27. The members of the Alliance express their appreciation for the existing relationship between NATO and the countries of the Mediterranean Dialogue. However we see the need to strengthen this relationship and commit to investigate the implementation of methods for the development of more substantial structures.

28. The Alliance accords substantial importance to the development of a Greater Middle-Eastern and North-African Dialogue. The Alliance considers the stability of the Greater Middle-East and North-Africa to be one of the most important conditions for ensuring the security of the region and of the world. Stability in the Greater Middle-East and North-Africa will also help to alleviate the threat of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, the Alliance will make efforts to initiate a formal relationship between NATO and the countries of the Greater Middle-East and North-Africa.

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29. NATO is willing to explore the development of closer relationships with other countries on a bilateral basis expressing an interest in assisting with NATO out-of-area operations.

30. NATO shall establish a Centre for training, analysis and consulting on the peaceful resolution of conflicts and conflict prevention and management. The Centre is to maintain a close cooperation with similar bodies (including those of the EU, the United Nations, other international organisations as well as member states).

31. We express our deep appreciation for the gracious hospitality extended to us by the Government of Turkey, the Turkish Atlantic Council, Community of Volunteers Foundation and Koc University as well as the initiative and efforts of the Atlantic Council of the United States, NATO Public Diplomacy Division and the Atlantic Treaty Association. Here in Istanbul, a city that bridges two continents, we have reaffirmed our commitment to the Alliance, we have strengthened the Alliance's ability to deal with the threats and challenges of an ever changing world.