

# EUROPEAN CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN TRANSITION

Implications for Finland and Sweden

Eeva Hautamäki and Janne Halttu (eds.)

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ATLANTIC COUNCIL OF FINLAND

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**Implications for Finland and Sweden**  
**Eeva Hautamäki and Janne Halttu (eds.)**

Contributions to the Conference

“Developing European Crisis Management Capabilities – Challenges for Finland”  
organised by the Atlantic Council of Finland and the European Security Forum  
in Helsinki on 28 April 2005.

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# THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL OF FINLAND

The Atlantic Council of Finland (ACF) was founded on 16 December 1999. The ACF became an Associate Member of the Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA) at the 46th General Assembly of ATA, held in Budapest on 3 November 2000.

The purpose of the Atlantic Council of Finland is to promote discussion, research and information in Finland on Euro-Atlantic security and defence policy issues, with a special focus on NATO and the EU. The Council aims at strengthening respect for peace, stability, democracy and human rights in Europe. The Council is independent of all political parties. In order to promote its aims, the Council organises conferences and other events for its members and other interested parties, in addition to publishing articles and providing other educational activities.

Over and above its domestic activities, the Atlantic Council of Finland participates in the international ATA framework and in the events organised by other Atlantic Councils. The Atlantic Council of Finland maintains especially close relations with the Nordic and the Baltic Atlantic Councils.

The Atlantic Council of Finland also includes an organisation for youth activities: the Atlantic Council of Finland Youth Network. The Youth Network aims at promoting the ACF's objectives among a group of interested students and young professionals. The Youth Network also participates in international activities organised by the Youth Atlantic Treaty Association (YATA).

Further information on the Atlantic Council of Finland, and on all our publications, can be found on our Web site at [www.atlanttiseura.org](http://www.atlanttiseura.org).

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Atlantic Council of Finland is grateful for the speakers' presentations, which accounted for the excellence of the conference discussions and the advancement of the understanding of issues described in this report. We would like to express our gratitude to the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs for supporting the conference and the report. We would also like to acknowledge the European Security Forum for the valuable cooperation in organising the seminar.



## FROM THE EDITORS

This publication is seventh in the series of Atlantic Council of Finland (ACF) Occasional Papers. Section 1 combines the opening addresses of Mrs. Liisa Jaakonsaari and Mr. Juha Pyykönen and serves as an introduction to the themes discussed later in the publication. Section 2 on the European crisis management capabilities contains the contributions of the different panellists. The contributions are presented as close to verbatim as possible without sacrificing the readability of this publication. Section 3 on the implications for the participating states comprises the comment address of Dr. Hanna Ojanen as well as a thematic summary of the panel discussion. The editors' aim has been to keep true to the line of argument, the tone and nuance of the speakers, and to emphasise the most pertinent questions without unnecessary repetition. A complete seminar programme is available at the end of this publication.

The contributors are leading experts on European crisis management. They include Major General Jean-Pierre Herreweghe, Brigadier Roy Hunstok, Major General Michael Moore and Dr. Hanna Ojanen. In addition to the above mentioned, Dr. Pauli Järvenpää gave an insightful contribution to the panel discussion. We are grateful for their input. The foreword of this publication was written by Dr. Risto E.J. Penttilä, the Chairman of the ACF and a leading Finnish foreign and security policy expert.

We would like to express our gratitude to Ms. Pia Heikkurinen, Ms. Karoliina Honkanen and Mr. Martti Setälä for their guidance and comments on the drafts of this publication. We would also like to thank Dr. Anthony De Carvalho and Mr. Matthew Friar for their help with the English language. Last but not least, we would like to thank to Mr. Kimmo Aaltonen for the graphic design of this publication.

Helsinki, 18 August 2005

Eeva Hautamäki and Janne Halttu



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# FOREWORD

The future role of EU Battlegroups and their relationship with corresponding NATO structures has been a topic of intense debate among security experts in Europe and in the US. At the same time defence planners in Finland, Sweden and Austria have been confronted with the question of what is the proper role for militarily non-aligned countries in European crisis management.

The Atlantic Council of Finland is pleased to publish this timely report on EU Battlegroups and on the NATO Response Force. The report seeks to shed light on the future of European crisis management and to analyse the role of small states within the evolving structures. Most of the contributions look at these questions from the point of view of Finland and Sweden.

The report is based on the conference titled “Developing European Crisis Management Capabilities – Challenges for Finland”, jointly organised by the European Security Forum and the Atlantic Council of Finland on 28 April 2005. It should be noted that the conference took place before the rejection of the European Constitution by the French and the Dutch. Consequently, there are no references to the impact of the constitutional crisis, if any, on the future of European crisis management capabilities.

The aim of the Atlantic Council of Finland is to promote discussion about European and transatlantic security challenges. We believe that this report adds an important new perspective to the debate on European security in Finland.

I would like to thank Ms. Eeva Hautamäki and Mr. Janne Halttu for compiling and editing this report.

Risto E.J. Penttilä

Chairman

Atlantic Council of Finland



# SECTION 1 – INTRODUCING EU CRISIS MANAGEMENT

## **Crisis Management Capabilities of the European Union**

Based on the addresses by Liisa Jaakonsaari and Juha Pyykönen<sup>1</sup>

This section presents a short introduction to the crisis management capabilities of the European Union. It provides a historical background for the development of the common European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and a discussion of both military and civilian crisis management capabilities of the EU.

Commenting on the development of EU's crisis management capabilities, both Liisa Jaakonsaari and Juha Pyykönen emphasised that the EU crisis management concept has developed rapidly. Pyykönen reminded us that “it was only some five years ago when the Heads of State and Government launched the ESDP here in Helsinki”, allowing the EU to establish its first military institutions. However, it was the Maastricht Treaty, signed in 1992, and its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) that laid the foundation for future development.<sup>2</sup>

Since the end of the Cold War, the EU has gradually developed its military capabilities. This has been due to the tragic lessons learned in Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda and elsewhere in the world. The EU was frustrated to see that it could not put an end to the brutal war in the former Yugoslavia as a political solution was only reached when NATO, or the United States, a non-European power, became resolute enough to enforce peace in the area.

Militarily, the Europeans were almost totally dependent on the resources of the United States. However, the US wanted to encourage the development of European crisis management capabilities, at least to a

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<sup>1</sup> Juha Pyykönen's presentation was based on the recent publication by the Department of Strategic and Defence Studies of the National Defence College (Mika Kerttunen, Tommi Koivula and Tommy Jeppsson: “EU Battlegroups. Theory and Development in the Light of Finnish-Swedish Co-operation”. Department of Strategic and Defence Studies, Series 2, No 30. Helsinki 2005).

<sup>2</sup> With the phrase “... which might in time lead to a common defence”. See article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty.

certain extent. Thus, gradually the notion of a basic European security deficit became more obvious.

In December 1998 at a Franco-British Summit in St. Malo, two major European military actors made a compromise related to the Atlantic Partnership and a European defence arrangement. The United Kingdom changed its reluctant attitude toward EU defence, paving the way for further initiatives.

The Battlegroup concept is one of the latest innovations in the development of EU's military crisis management capabilities. Institutionally, one could observe the birth of the EU Battlegroup (EUBG) concept taking place in three phases. It commenced with the Helsinki Headline Goal process in 1999 and was followed by the approval of the European Security Strategy and the successful implementation of Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003. The EU is adjusting its tools to meet the challenges of new emerging threats. In the contemporary world, the first line of defence is often abroad and engagement must be preventive, if possible. Nevertheless, some shortcomings still exist in rapid response capabilities.

Lt. Colonel Pyykönen argued that there seems to be some variation between the EU's political ambition, expressed in political rhetoric, when contrasted against the actual military capabilities of EUBG countries. He stated that the EUBG concept was not intended for 'small wars', but for 'short wars' instead. The rationale is that currently crisis management is needed for 'small wars' of long duration with limited and flexible use of force. The question is whether the Battlegroup concept can meet this demand. Fortunately, several options for improvement are available through enhanced EU-NATO cooperation as well as in improved coordination and utilisation of various EU capabilities. Naturally, a common understanding of ends, ways and means would help bring the desired results in political, financial, civilian, military and police fields. In this respect, suitable tasks that are politically important and militarily feasible are a necessity.

Finland takes part in two EU Battlegroups. A practical rationale for participating in two Battlegroups is to enable a more even flow of trainees. According to Pyykönen, this makes it easier to optimise training and education. The Swedish-Finnish-Norwegian Battlegroup, together with the Estonian contribution, has some inherent value and underlines tradition of successful Nordic cooperation in numerous operations. The German-Dutch-Finnish Battlegroup provides cooperation with two strong and experienced EU and NATO countries. One

should also note that both compositions consist of countries that emphasise the transatlantic link.

However, a number of important questions need to be answered in due course. These include, for instance, national decision-making in relation to EU procedures and national legislation, especially issues of mandate, status and rights. Furthermore, rules of engagement as well as strategic enablers are core issues. Of course, questions concerning funding, recruiting, training and education, contracting, terms of service and acquisition need to be solved as well.

In Lt. Col. Pyykönen's view, Finland's current level of contribution is not necessarily satisfactory in the long run. Finland cannot meet the demanding role of a Framework Nation due to scarce financial resources. As an alternative, based on current and developing capabilities and assets, the Finnish contribution could be extended step by step. These extensions could include Command and Control (C2), together with other already designated capabilities in the NATO Planning and Review Programme (PARP) such as F-18 C Hornet aircrafts. It seems clear that the ultimate goal of strengthening national defence through active and enhanced participation in multinational crisis management operations does not change the mainstream: Finland providing mainly second echelon troops for long-term operations.

The recruitment pool for Finnish military crisis management is probably unique. Recruits volunteer for crisis management duty and bring a multifaceted array of civilian expertise to their military roles. Finnish peacekeepers are doctors, engineers, technicians, social workers, nurses, etc. This is why Finnish peacekeepers have performed very well in the civilian-military cooperation or in the so-called CIMIC operations.

It was emphasised that more attention should be devoted also to the other side of the coin, to civilian crisis management. Conflicts are usually complex affairs where military skills are not sufficient – or even the foremost measures – in meeting the everyday requirements of local populations. Nor is the military the best option in redressing many of the problems that cause conflicts. Policemen, judges and other civilian experts are trained for this task.

Civilian crisis management is taking its first steps as a new policy field. Even though Finland has been at the forefront of civilian crisis management, at this stage the resources that Finland uses for civilian crisis management represent just one tenth of what is devoted to its military counterpart. However, military operations cost more and in the long

run prevention is the most humane and cost-effective way to manage crises. Mrs. Jaakonsaari together with the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Finnish Parliament perceive conflict prevention as crucial to civilian crisis management and stress that the protection of the civilian population is of paramount importance. Hence, the balance between military and civilian crisis management needs to change by increasing the resources available to civilian crisis management.

The Foreign Affairs Committee has stressed that civilian crisis management needs to be a core competence of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Accordingly, the Committee has argued that the resources designated to civilian crisis management are inadequate. It has emphasised that civilian crisis management needs to progress on all fronts: police operations, rescue, rule of law and public services. So far only police operations have a notable operational readiness. Furthermore, civilian crisis management should be included in development cooperation and environmental issues should be a part of civilian crisis management.

The lack of personnel is a practical challenge for civilian crisis management. The military now considers crisis management as a core competence. However, it is not easy to designate personnel to civilian crisis management operations; police and rescue personnel are already a scarce resource in their home organisations. One crucial challenge for civilian crisis management is to build adequate spare capacity into police and rescue forces to promote recruitment for civilian crisis management missions. Their home organisations need to recognise that civilian crisis management has become an important part of their operations.

In conclusion, it can be stated that crisis management has the best possibilities to succeed when the civilian and military sides are cooperating. Both types of crisis management are necessary and therefore they should be understood holistically and as inseparable.

## SECTION 2 – EUROPEAN CRISIS MANAGEMENT CAPABILITIES

### **NATO Response Force (NRF)**

Roy Hunstok

#### **Introduction**

NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson argued in Colorado Springs in 2003 that on paper there are 1.5 million European forces under arms while NATO has only 55,000 soldiers deployed to sustain ongoing operations. Yet, when asked for more, there are consistent cries from nations that NATO is over-committed.

This situation reflects some typical problems in NATO today. Firstly, the future of military funding is a difficult issue. Secondly, some member nations have a strong focus on homeland defence, which leads to a need in those countries to keep a rather static structure in their military forces. In 2003, however, NATO had an excess of three-figured brigades in the Alliance.

In 2002, the NATO Summit in Prague introduced several initiatives intended to transform the Alliance and to tackle some of today's challenges. First of all, the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) was declared in order to acquire the most critical capabilities. Secondly, a new command structure was approved and, thirdly, the NATO Response Force (NRF) concept was born. It is no secret that the NRF concept is a US initiative designed for the European pillar of NATO.

The Prague Summit Declaration states that the NATO Response Force is “a technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable and sustainable force, including land, sea and air elements ready to react quickly whenever needed, as decided by the Council.” In other words, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) has to reach consensus before the force can be deployed.

The target that ministers gave the NRF was to declare Initial Operating Capability (IOC) by October 2004. Accordingly, IOC was reached last year. The official plan is to reach Full Operational Capability (FOC)

in October 2006, but SACEUR's (Supreme Allied Commander, Europe) vision is to reach FOC by mid 2006.

NATO has three levels of readiness. It has forces at lower readiness (conflict resolution forces) while deployable forces are at high readiness and can be deployed at 0-90 days notice. Expeditionary forces include the NRF and are deployable in 5-30 days. So, the NRF is a tiered readiness joint force. The national elements are brought into the NRF framework from different parts of the force structure through a rotational system. The requirement for critical enablers like strategic lift (both sea and air) is a challenge for the NRF as well as for EU Battlegroups.

### **The NRF Concept**

The NRF concept can be divided into two parts. The first part requires that NATO maintain a capability to react to the threats of today. The second part revolves around the concept that NATO has transformational effects. The whole idea is that if NATO manages to rotate the entire force structure through the NRF system it will slowly change from a static posture to a rapidly deployable force. In order to achieve this, NATO has to set certain standards and criteria with regard to equipment and training. Consequently, some transformation of forces is required before participating in the NRF.

One can see tendencies that this divides the member states in two "camps". One camp regards the NRF as an operational force ready to be used. Another camp sees the NRF as a transformational tool. These nations use the NRF participation as a tool to increase their defence budget, but they are not necessarily willing to deploy the NRF. Nevertheless, the NRF is a vehicle for interoperability within the Alliance. SACEUR's vision is a complete deployable force structure. Rotating forces through NRF cycles leads to a force structure in which every element is eventually deployable and employable for the full range of NATO missions.

The initial guidance for the NRF from ministers was a force of 20,000 including strategic enablers. Eventually, after thorough military analysis, NATO ended up with force of 25,000. The Combined Joint Statement of Requirement (CJSOR) is a force catalogue describing line by line what kinds of forces are needed in the NRF.

### **Towards Full Operational Capability**

NATO established the first force on 15 October 2003, only eleven months after the Prague Summit. Currently, NRF 4 is on standby. NATO has performed Force Generation Conferences, where nations are asked to contribute. In addition, command and control arrangements have been developed, a training system has been established and the necessary criteria and concept have been developed. Following the final approval of the logistics concept, everything will be ready from the military point of view.

It has been difficult to solve the question of logistics when 15 participating nations bring their own national support elements. Nations cannot be told that they are not allowed to bring their national support elements into the theatre. What needs to be done is to create a concept utilizing these national support elements, giving the commander a possibility of having one entry point into this multinational logistics system. This logistic concept was approved in a senior logisticians' conference in Brussels in the end of April 2005.

NRF 7 will establish Full Operational Capability in 2006. Despite the rapid development there are some unresolved issues with regard to the NRF and some shortfalls still exist. In order to test the NRF concept, the force needs to be moved over a strategic distance into an area with limited or no host nation support. SACEUR will do this through a live exercise, which will take place in Cape Verde in the summer of 2005. SACEUR has also written to member states indicating that more forces and capabilities are required in order to achieve FOC in time. A Force Generation conference will take place in the summer of 2005, giving member states an opportunity to make further contributions.

There are still numerous issues to be solved before FOC can be declared. These include Staff Assisted Visits (SAV) to check whether second-level headquarters are ready to command NRF operations. The CJSOR/Force catalogue should be filled 100 per cent. Currently, there is only about 50 per cent capacity of CJSOR. Strategic airlift must be in place through capabilities themselves or contracts enabling assured access to the aircraft or ships on short notice. It is noteworthy that movement over a strategic distance is often faster by sea than through the use of strategic airlifts. Currently, NATO lacks some command and control equipment but, hopefully, this gap will be filled next year.

One should not forget that a fast and swift political decision-making system is the foundation of the NRF. Rapid reaction force has little

value if political decision-making takes months. In addition, the right funding arrangements should be in place before the force is fully operational. Different courses of action have been proposed for funding both NRF operations and NRF exercises. A new training and exercise system has been developed for NRF, which urges nations to use NRF participation as their exclusive venue for training.

### **Myths and facts about the NRF**

The fact that the NRF has not been used has created myths about the force. First of all, the NRF is not a imaginary force that will never be used. Elements of the force have been used already in high visibility events such as the Euro 2004 Football Championships, the Istanbul Summit and the Olympic Games in Greece.

The NRF is not a reserve force. It can deploy in support of a reserve mission, but it will always maintain its own command and control system. Despite the fact that some of the earmarked forces have already been pulled out of the NRF and been sent to Afghanistan, the NRF will not be used as a 'gap-filler' to cover shortfalls in other missions.

The NRF will not always deploy its full complement of 25,000 troops. The NRF commander will always tailor the force according to the mission. NRF missions range from opposed entry scenario to smaller scale humanitarian relief missions and, therefore, the force can be deployed partially.

The NRF is not in competition with the EU Battlegroups. From a military perspective this is a matter of necessary coordination of the rotation systems and the challenge is merely to manage rotational systems. EU forces may be asked to assist a NRF missions because they have the same training system.

The PfP (Partnership for Peace) nations will not be excluded from NRF participation, but full operating capability must be reached within NATO before PfP nations may be asked to participate. However, PfP nations may participate only on an ad hoc basis when specific capabilities are needed. This does, however, require trained and interoperable forces.

## EU Battlegroups (EUBG)

Jean-Pierre Herreweghe

### Introduction

NATO's Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) Admiral Rainer Feist was the Operational Commander in the first EU military operation – Operation Concordia in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (fYROM) – in accordance with the Berlin Plus arrangements. He has argued that EU and NATO have many similarities despite their differences. This is partly due to the fact that the member states of NATO and EU are mostly the same set of countries. As a consequence, even if there is an intention to use the same documents in both organisations, they are likely to differ slightly. Moreover, both organisations have similar problems and shortfalls with regard to political decision-making, political ambition and military capabilities.

### Capabilities

The Helsinki Headline Goal 1999 and Operation Artemis were starting points for EU Battlegroups initiative. The Helsinki Headline Goal stated that, by the year 2003, the EU should be able to deploy up to 50,000-60,000 troops within 60 days and sustain them for at least one year. Member states also agreed to develop smaller high readiness elements. However, according to the Helsinki Headline Goal, the EU member states do not commit forces, but capabilities. This means, that if a member state, such as Belgium decided to provide a paracommando battalion for an EU mission, it would offer a paracommando battalion to be deployed after the decision to participate in an operation. There are, of course, better ways working in terms of rapid reaction. On the contrary, if Belgium wanted to contribute a paracommando battalion to the NRF, it would have to choose at an early stage which paracommando battalion in order to permit the battalion to train with the NRF and be certified by NATO. This is one of the differences between the EU and NATO.

In 2003, the EU launched its second military crisis-management operation – Artemis – in the Democratic Republic of Congo at the request of the UN. Eventually, this experience led to a realisation that procedures and military capabilities have to be adapted according to the demands of rapid reaction capability. Furthermore, the decision was

taken to complement the Helsinki Headline Goal in the field of Rapid Response, among other things, by putting the Battle Groups Concepts together.

in May 2004, the EU Council adopted the Headline Goal 2010, in which the member states commit to be able, that of by 2010, to respond with rapid and decisive action, applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations (Petersberg tasks) covered by the Treaty of the European Union (TEU, Amsterdam Treaty) and integrating the development of the Battlegroups to this overall capability development.

### **The EU Battlegroups Concept**

Battle Groups are designed for a wide range of missions covering also the enhanced missions described in the European Security Strategy and, in the future, they should be able to fulfil even wider set of missions as foreseen in the EU Constitution, of course after its ratification. Sustainability of the Battle Groups is 30 days, but extendable to 120 days. Operational Commander should have the opportunity to adapt the forces according to the mission. The Battle Groups should always be mission tailored. But it should not be forgotten that other rapid reaction options still exist.

The Battlegroup package consists of a reinforced mechanized infantry battalion strengthened by combat support and combat service support units and operational and strategic enablers. Airlift and sealift capabilities are critical in the deployment of the core element. Furthermore, the package includes Force Headquarters and command and control structures.

Complementarity is important because the same set of forces used in NATO, the EU and the UN created a need for standardisation of criteria, training procedures and certification processes. Units should not be committed to EU and NATO missions simultaneously, but when a mechanized battalion is not committed to the EUBG, it could be committed to a NRF brigade in order to improve interoperability. Committing the same units to both organisations at different times is the best preparation.

In the first Military Capabilities Commitment Conference (MCCC) in November 2004, the member states made initial commitments to form up to 13 Battlegroups. Moreover, some nations offered important niche capabilities such as medical groups, water purification unit, Sea Lift

Co-ordination Centre and structures for a multinational and deployable Force Headquarters. The Member States commit forces in advance to the Battlegroups but training and certification will remain the responsibility of the Member States.

In the case of operation Artemis, political decision was successfully made in ten days. In the future, the goal is to shorten decision-making to five days. This requires new procedures and is a real challenge for political decision-making. When the EU considers the appropriate action to take regarding a crisis, it has to decide on measures. One should not forget that other rapid reaction options still exist, and that the Rapid Reaction Battlegroups are only one option. With regard to the Battlegroups, the starting point is the approval of a crisis management concept. Then the Council has five days to make the political decision to launch an operation. After that, the Battlegroup should start implementing the mission on the ground within no later than ten days. This time frame requires high readiness of 5-10 days for the Battlegroups. It also means that the member states should be prepared for parliamentary authorization, if needed, to deploy the units in this short period of time.

Initial Operational Capability (IOC) was reached in January 2005, meaning that at least one Battlegroup is on standby. At the moment, the EU has a UK Battlegroup ready to be deployed and it will be followed by an Italian BG next semester. France is ready to support if the UK Battlegroup is not available for deployment. When the Full Operational Capability (FOC) is reached in January 2007, at least two Battlegroups will be on standby at all times. Furthermore, the EU should have the capability and readiness to deploy them simultaneously within ten days. In IOC it is possible only to deploy some elements of the forces after the ten day deadline because the challenge for strategic sealift and airlift is too great to allow for full deployment. During the IOC, training and certification are the full responsibility of the member states. This will continue under Full Operational Capability, but the procedures will be determined by the EU. In order to maintain the desire for complementarity with NATO, they are based on NATO procedures that have been transformed into EU ones.

The first Battlegroup Generation Conference (BGGC) will be held in May 2005, and is set to occur every six months. The purpose of these conferences is to plan five years ahead and request offers and ideas from member states. BGGCs offer the possibility to gradually develop capabilities in coordination with other member states. The procedure

in brief is that first is the member states make initial offers, the second step is to commit a BG package and, finally, to work everything out in detail. BGGCs are also a coordinating mechanism for member states with regard to remaining shortfalls and military training of the Battle-groups.

## A Swedish View of the EU Battlegroups

Michael Moore

Sweden has sought neutrality in the international system for 200 years and being outside alliances and wars for two centuries has influenced the Swedish mindset. A rather strong EU scepticism in Sweden reflects this perception of being “outside Europe.” However, in spite of the tradition of non-alignment, there has been strong political commitment to the transatlantic link in Sweden. Since the Cold War period Sweden has had especially close relations with the US.

Finland and Sweden maintain a very long peacekeeping tradition dating back to 1950s. Tens of thousands of Swedish soldiers have participated in UN peacekeeping operations in Lebanon, Cyprus and several other places. During 1990s, through operations in former Yugoslavia, Swedish forces participated in a peacekeeping mission under NATO command in Bosnia and Kosovo. In fact, since the mid 1990s, there has been a trend toward international commitments through different organisations, meaning that Swedish armed forces have been obliged to meet the requirements of international standards and tasks.

Perhaps due to the Nordic peacekeeping tradition both Finland and Sweden tend to emphasise civil-military cooperation. Both countries have been pushing these issues in the European Union. However, they also participate in EU Battlegroups, which should reach Full Operational Capability (FOC) by 2007. The Nordic Battlegroup should be on standby for the first six-month period in 2008. Sweden is the framework nation of the Nordic BG and has, accordingly, tremendous responsibility to live up to the expectations of a framework nation. However, this is a positive challenge because it really drives the transformation process in the armed forces and has implications on all parts of the armed forces in Sweden. In addition to Finnish contributions to the Nordic BG, Estonia plans to provide a force protection team and expected Norwegian participation is significant – despite the fact that Norway is not a member of the EU. Moreover, the Nordic Battlegroup cooperates with the UK regarding both Force Headquarters and Operational Headquarters. So far, this cooperation has been very helpful and successful.

The shortfalls and gaps of the EU Battlegroups are roughly the same as in the NRF system. The Nordic BG lacks helicopter support and airlift capabilities. Another critical question is which type of vehicles

will be making up the bulk of the manoeuvre unit regarding the armoured fighting vehicles. They should be able to go in through tactical airlift, meaning that the vehicles must be rather light. This would enable rapid deployment in inland areas such as Central Africa. Both Finland and Sweden may have armoured personnel carriers (APCs) that are too heavy for this purpose.

The decision-making process is also a challenge in the EU system as well as in the four countries participating in the Nordic Battlegroup. Nevertheless, a tremendous amount of work is going on in the EU system and between the Ministries of Defence. Work is being done on the political level to solve legal aspects, while the Headquarters of armed forces is working on several issues such as order of battle, equipment, procedures, consultations, command and control (C2), intelligence, logistics, infrastructure, training, exercises, certification, information and media strategies. Even though the EUBG concept offers a practical way to remodel the Swedish conscript system, three years seems to be an overly short period of time to transform the armed forces.

Similar transformation processes began simultaneously in the Norwegian and Swedish armed forces in the summer of 2000. This transformation has generated a lot of debate on the political level as well as in the military. It was questioned by many people due to their long commitment to national and territorial defence. During the Cold War, Sweden had rather large defence forces and self-sufficient defence industry. Nevertheless, the reasons for this transformation are quite clear. In a totally new threat environment challenges cannot be met on a national level. It has become clear during recent years that threats must be met in a multinational way. In this sense, security has become global.

When the transformation of the armed forces began in 2000, the media focused on reductions. The strategy in rebalancing the armed forces has been reductions – taking away many capabilities and units – but also creating new capabilities. The emphasis is now on creating new types of units such as an airborne battalion, high readiness and information warfare units, as well as on developing network-centric warfare. These new capabilities are linked to interoperability. Furthermore, all of these assets will have a link to the Battlegroups. The EUBG concept provides the vehicle for transformation and achieving the main goal of creating internationally deployable units.

Remodelling the conscript system is one of the major challenges in this transformation process. Similar to the situation in Finland, there is strong political sentiment for keeping the conscript system as a way of manning the army. Sweden does not need the amount of forces as in the Cold War era, but it has been difficult to convince the decision-makers at the political level to remodel the conscript system. From a military point of view, Sweden should maintain its foundation in the conscript system, but needs to remodel in a direction similar to that of Germany, Denmark, and to some extent Norway. In the armed forces, a tremendous amount of effort has been made to provide basic training for conscripts who are then sent home. This kind of system is not in use in any other sector of society. The amount of resources used in basic training should be reduced in order to train voluntary professional soldiers who can be used in international tasks.

## SECTION 3 – IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PARTICIPATING STATES

Comment:

### **European Crisis Management Capabilities: Who Benefits?**

Hanna Ojanen

In this comment, the issue of European crisis management capabilities will be looked at from the point of view of the “receiving end”, posing the question of who benefits from these increasing and improving capabilities – and who should benefit from them.

It may appear easy to enumerate the beneficiaries of improved European crisis management capabilities. In fact, comparative advantage or profit, whether in the realm of economic, military or political, is an obvious argument in favour of these moves. As a matter of fact, all seem to gain: the two organisations, the EU and NATO, gain in credibility or in means. They can keep their promises about efficient crisis management. The defence industry gains if more of its output is consumed. The defence administration gains from increased international contacts. Researchers gain in that there is a rich new research agenda to study questions regarding the pace of integration and to what extent it will evolve. Finally, individual countries gain, especially Finland. It is often claimed that this kind of cooperation strengthens Finnish security and defence.

It is more seldom that one hears about the people who suffer from a conflict as the beneficiaries. Another potential beneficiary that often seems too abstract to be referred to is the international system or the international community. These short remarks concentrate on this broader context: the effects the development of European crisis management capability has on the international system. One can argue that the international community really needs these capabilities. So, here the point of view of the subscriber/customer is taken, namely that of the United Nations. The EU and NATO are part of this system, and the consequences of their actions for the system are by no means negligible.

It will be argued that while Europe's crisis management capability can truly benefit the international community, this is not to be taken for granted. These activities may also create problems and challenges, or at worst, undermine the community itself. Claims to an autonomous role and efficient action in furthering international peace and security may lead to a temptation to start remodelling the rules and norms of the system. By growing out of the system such organisations do themselves a disservice.

Why does the UN need organisations such as NATO and the EU? The UN needs, first of all, capabilities. If it has a monopoly in the legitimate use of force in international society, it could also be held responsible for providing that force. But it lacks the means. Second, it needs observance of rules and norms. Third, the UN needs reinforcement for its own proposed reforms, ones necessary to keep it functioning and credible.

Does the UN get what it wants? The signals are mixed. Political attention is not exactly focused on the UN, at least not in countries where the EU and NATO are considered as new and much more interesting. On the capabilities side, there is enthusiasm for assistance and development - at least on paper. For instance, the EU devotes a considerable part of its security strategy to the support of international rules and norms, and of the UN system in particular.

The EU is also pulling itself together in regards to UN reform. The European Council (Brussels 22-23 March 2005) agreed to present a common position on Kofi Annan's reform plan. This will be the first time the EU has a common position on UN reform. Yet, unanimity is still lacking. Security Council reform and the rules for the use of force are the two points out of twelve where a common position may not be achieved.

The UN's way toward approaching the EU and NATO is via a category that already is in the UN Charter, namely, the role of: regional arrangements or regional organisations. Improving the UN's relations with such actors is one of the concrete measures that the Secretary General proposes as a way to increased operational capability.<sup>3</sup> In the words of the Secretary General, the UN needs "agile and effective regional and global intergovernmental institutions"<sup>4</sup> to complement its own activities.

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<sup>3</sup> See *A more secure world: Our shared responsibility*. Report of Secretary General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. United Nations 2004. <http://www.un.org/secureworld/report3.pdf>

<sup>4</sup> *In larger freedom*, p. 6.

Regional organisations, as defined in the Charter, are autonomous in peaceful settlement of local conflicts (with a duty to report on the measures taken), but they cannot resort to force without being asked to do so by the Security Council.

However, such a position might not be what the EU and NATO are looking for. First, they are not really 'regional' at all, and do not want to be 'regional' only. And both fit also categories, namely that of an organisation for collective self-defence, mentioned elsewhere in the Charter.

Second, both NATO and the EU need to boost their own credibility. NATO needs it in order to avoid being disregarded as a redundant organisation and the EU in order not to be belittled in its new vocation as a security political actor. This may lead them to start new actions and to invent missions and tasks almost for the sake of proving their relevance. One can also discern elements of competition between the two: the rush to rapid, and even more rapid action, to advanced and even more advanced equipment, to a global and even more global reach – and a struggle for autonomy, which becomes increasingly important the more the two are pushed towards working together.

The EU is occupying an ever larger spot in the political landscape. It is pushed by its internal dynamics and by a certain devolution that takes place from NATO to the EU. There is also a virtuous circle element in that the more the EU does and the more it promises, the more is expected from it.

One clear tendency for the EU has been to try to demonstrate that it is indeed an autonomous actor, something that was set as an aim in 1998. More established actors do not need to show this. In practice, this means autonomy both from its member states, to the extent this is possible, and from other actors, in particular other international organisations. Thus, there is a need to give evidence of this autonomous action capacity, which leads to a certain propensity to start operations as tangible signs of this capacity. Also, the EU feels compelled to construct a profile of its own that distinguishes it fully from other international organisations.

The ESDP is still very much in the making, but looking at the European Security Strategy (ESS), one can find signs of the EU aiming at a high profile in international relations, as a supporter and defender of international norms and institutions, and as an advocate of the UN. Yet, the EU is also under pressure to deliver, to show that it indeed is

a real and capable actor. This is because of the very fact that it still is a newcomer in its role as a security political actor and an underdog in comparison with NATO. It is as if the EU would need to have all the same options that any other independent actor has: no formal restrictions as to the means with which it desires to implement its own strategies and no formal hierarchical relations with other actors.

Neither the EU nor NATO is a disinterested actor at the service of someone else. Both want the freedom to select what they undertake, and they have a tendency to select operations that clearly reflect their interests, as well as operations that they can manage. The EU has started with easy and well-limited operations in order to avoid failure.

Indeed, one of the main worries of the UN has been the developed nations' disdain for UN operations: they show clear preference for NATO, the EU or *ad hoc* coalition-led operations that are deployed in regions of strategic, political or economic interest to contributing nations.

Moreover, organisations such as the EU and NATO may, in defence of their autonomy and ability to act, also want to stretch international norms and reinterpret them. Certainly they do not want to be kept hostage by outside powers by way of, for instance, a veto on a UN mandate. For some reason, this seems to worry the Finnish policy makers in particular. As the Finnish Minister of Defence put it, if the UN is unable to ask for help, help can be given anyway, when there is a clear-cut case of action that conforms with the principles of the United Nations and works for its goals.<sup>5</sup> In other words, the EU can, and even should, take the UN's role and take decisions on its behalf.

To me it would seem that there is no need for Finland or any other country to work particularly in this direction, to ensure such a possibility. There is no doubt regarding the EU's ability to act alone and forge the rules.

The EU is the most important Western partner of the UN and the strongest grouping within it. It risks becoming even too strong and therefore contested. It is perhaps growing too similar to the UN to fit into a subordinate role now that it wants to share in the responsibility for global security with the UN. Thus, the EU needs to be particularly careful in its approach.

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<sup>5</sup> Seppo Kääriäinen on 18 April 2005 in Helsinki at a seminar organised by CMI.

Both NATO and the EU can gain in legitimacy by cooperating with the UN, and, in turn, they can strengthen the credibility of the UN with their assets. NATO's assets have to do with military power and a certain military integration even of countries outside a Europe narrowly defined.

The EU has two assets of special importance: its multilateral vocation and its institutionally advanced system, the political union. These make the EU a more challenging partner for the UN than NATO can ever be. While it wants to uphold and strengthen the norms, it also wants the UN to be more effective as compensation for this support.

At the same time, however, it is also the EU that is able to make a difference. If there is an organisation that has shown reform potential, it is the EU, which is certainly no longer working on the basis of a treaty from the 1940s as NATO and the UN are. Being sufficiently separate and above its member states, representing a political union of a unique kind, it can, if it wants to, exert influence on the UN.

The UN has already done a lot for the EU to deserve this additional effort in exchange. The EU operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo was an important symbol and perhaps a start of a new phase in relations between the organisations. The UN actually asked the EU to step in with its crisis management capabilities at a critical time when the EU's capacities were still almost untested and lacked credibility for many. This was an important recognition by the UN of the EU's capacity to act. Moreover, the EU decided to act without leaning on the Berlin Plus agreement. As a consequence, the EU Battle Groups concept was further developed. The Battle Groups, again, play also an important internal role in the Union. They increase the member countries' individual responsibility and commitment, and also increase the coherence of the EU system. Their function might even be compared to that of the rotating EU Council presidency, which helps to engage the countries more deeply.

It could now be the turn of the EU to work for the UN and its reform, for the new security consensus that the Secretary General has been advocating. The EU could support the work on the rules concerning the use of force, and a more efficient Security Council. Perhaps it could also work for an upgrading of the role of regional organisations. This is an important role of the EU that its member states should also keep in mind.

## The EUBG and the NRF: Challenges for the Participating States

A thematic summary of the panel discussion<sup>6</sup>

The topic of the panel discussion, “Developing European Crisis Management Capabilities: Implications for the Participating States”, led the participants to elaborate on the topic both with general remarks and from national perspectives. The EUBG and NRF relationship was analysed as was future perspectives regarding the development of the European security environment. The state of transatlantic relations within NATO was also considered. One of the most pertinent questions in the debate was the need for rapid decision-making processes in order to guarantee the success of the rapid reaction forces in crisis management. It was argued that the main implication for the participating states is the need to transform their armed forces in order to meet the requirements of international operations.

### **EUBG and NRF: coordination or competition?**

The European Union Battlegroups and NATO Response Forces are often perceived as overlapping and in competition with each other. The panellists clarified the situation claiming that although similar, they are not in competition. Rather they support and complement each other.

The comparison “fire brigade – ambulance” is often referred to when discussing the relation between the NRF and the EUBG. The NRF can mobilise about 25,000 troops simultaneously while the EUBG can mobilise about 3,000. Which one is more important in crisis management? It was argued that you need both the ambulance and the fire brigade in crisis management, so the answer is therefore not either the EU or NATO, but both. Complementarity is the keyword in describing the desired relations between these two forces.

Militarily, despite occasional differences in opinion, there are no elements of competition between the NRF and the EUBG. It was, however, admitted that this is not always the case on the political side: politically it is more difficult to reach unanimity. There are clearly positions taken by states that are members of both organisations and

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<sup>6</sup> References are not indicated in this part because the purpose of the summary is to outline the discussion on a thematic basis.

that want to slow down either of the processes. According to one panellist, we are members of too many organisations. Militarily this generates a big challenge because the effort is spread around across many organisations and countries. The panellist remembers, for instance, Javier Solana's statement when he heard about the NRF initiative: he saw it as a competing system with that of the EU.

On the other hand, it was recalled that most EU and NATO countries provide the same troops and units for both the NRF and EUBG, which necessitates close coordination between the two organisations. The EU and NATO countries, by double-hatting various troops for both the NRF and EUBG, need to ensure that their resources and personnel are not in conflict. In practice, the Battlegroup standards as well as practical operational methods and procedures will be harmonised with their NATO counterparts, which decreases the danger of duplication.

When the idea of the EUBG was launched, its objective was clearly set: to have a mission-tailored force. Operation Artemis in the Congo was a starting point, and the Battlegroup was tailored for that mission specifically. Afterwards, the BG concept was worked out around a reinforced mechanised infantry battalion. It was also emphasised that one should be very cautious in terms of where this kind of force would be applied. Naturally the whole spectrum of the Petersberg Tasks<sup>7</sup> is a possibility, but still it requires a lot of pondering when deciding when and where to send a battalion-sized force.

It is sometimes argued that the EUBG has had to invent its missions in order to prove its capacity in managing a crisis. The panellists reacted differently to this statement. While one member argued that the EUBG does not have to invent its missions, another acknowledged that this has indeed been the case. The argument against the invention of missions was that there are currently a lot of escalated conflicts going on for example in Africa. The dead are counted in tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands, even millions before the EU is able to act. There are many possible prospective missions around the world, but it is another question entirely when dealing with the political side of proposed ventures. On the other hand, it was pointed out that when the ESDP was launched in 1999, there was a willingness to prove that what had been decided was going to be carried out. In 2003, there was

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<sup>7</sup> The Petersberg Tasks are the following: arms control, humanitarian and rescue tasks, consultation and support in military matters, conflict prevention and peacekeeping, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, peace-making and post-conflict stabilization.

will to do something and there were people who were really looking for an operation to demonstrate the EU's potential in the field. Operation Concordia in FYROM and Operation Artemis in Congo were well-fitted and simple enough for this purpose.

What differentiates the EU Security and Defence Policy from NATO is that the EU-led operations can be civilian as well as military. Currently, there are more civilian operations going on in the field of ESDP than there are military. The EU has had three military operations: Concordia, Artemis and the on-going Althea. Civilian operations also started in 2003. The police missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and FYROM and the training of police missions in Kinshasa serve as a few examples. There is also EU-JUST, a rule-of-law mission in Georgia. The EU is also instituting security section reform in Congo.

#### **Advantages and disadvantages of rapid deployment forces**

The development of rapid deployment forces such as the NRF or EUBG has definite advantages. First, these small and light forces make it possible to go into a crisis quickly and much earlier, thus preventing the crisis from escalating. Going in too late means it has to be done heavily and in large volume. For example, Concordia in FYROM proved to be a very successful intervention. The situation in Macedonia in 2002-03 was deteriorating very quickly. Just the fact that there were these few hundred soldiers and their teams from the beginning (first NATO and then EU) was enough to calm the area and the crisis abated. That proves that if you are able to get in at an early stage of a crisis, before the violence escalates, at least in many cases there will be a positive outcome. Another question is when is it early enough and according to what rules and norms should the intervention be carried out.

Another positive thing from the view of the panel members was that the development of the rapid deployment forces makes the participating states realise a transformation in their forces is needed. Better, sharper and more technologically capable forces are going to be produced. This demand for swiftness and rapidity is not only at the international stage but also at the national dimension of defence. Threats may not be the same as they used to be and they may not be so large, but they can also emerge very quickly and unexpectedly. That means that even at a national context one has to be rapid.

While the panellists agreed that there are a lot of positive aspects with respect to the development of the rapid reaction forces, it was never-

theless acknowledged that there should not be too high expectations on what can be done with them. As an example, one panellist mentioned that there is a tendency to think about the NRF in terms of Article 5 of the NATO Charter, even though that is not necessarily what it is primarily meant for. The scope of the NRF missions is limited: it is a brigade (land formation) coupled with air and maritime units, which might be able to “kick in the doors” but not really more than that. It is a force that is “first in and first out”, namely an entry force.<sup>8</sup>

### **The outlook for defence and security organisations**

Considerable attention was also devoted to the future prospects of the various defence and security organisations operating in the field of crisis management. Currently in Europe, there are four different dimensions: the UN, NATO, the EU and an arrangement called the coalition of the willing, which was used for example in Iraq. A central question is: How could these different organisations cooperate politically in the best possible way and how could they best use the available resources?

It was asked how the security environment will look like in 10 to 15 years. Obviously none of the panellists could predict the future. It is indeed difficult to foresee what would happen in such a time period because looking back the same amount of years, dramatic changes have taken place. However, there are some interesting points to look at. In each of the above mentioned security arrangements the trend is very similar: everyone is calling for rapid and effective reactions to uprising problems, conflicts or crises.

One panel member felt that it is not necessarily problematic to have more actors than just one. All of the organisations and the coalition of the willing can have their own proper role. One should not expect that something amalgamated would grow from that. However, a common base or understanding on how to develop the forces is required. As mentioned above, it is important to be aware of the danger of duplication. The NRF and the EUBG need to be developed in accordance with each other. If this is not done properly, it can backfire on the organisations later.

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<sup>8</sup> While the EUBGs shall only be used for the Petersberg Tasks, the NRF can conduct or participate in the full range of NATO operations including Article 5 operations.

When it comes to NATO, according to one panellist, role specialisation will be an important goal in the future. The only problem is that quite likely some nations would not like to be reduced to the so-called niche capabilities. On the other hand, many newer member states have realised that they cannot afford to have the most modern defence system in their countries and therefore need to prioritise. A move towards specialisation must occur because NATO's Achilles heel is combat support and combat service support, i.e. logistics, and what the combat groups need in order to succeed in the field. That is where the NRF lacks contributions.

Some kind of transformation in the roles of the different organisations is likely to be seen. For example, NATO is mainly a military organisation but it is becoming increasingly political. The EU, on the other hand, is mainly political and economic but it is in the process of acquiring more and more elements of a military organisation. At the moment, it is possible for the EU to operate, although on a small scale, with or without recourse to NATO. In bigger operations it is still necessary to turn to NATO. For example in operation Concordia in FYROM, the EU took over the operation from NATO. After that, NATO was still involved in the operation as a strategic and operational reserve. If it had been necessary, it could have come to the EU's help. It remains to be seen whether NATO will in 15 years conduct operations with recourse to the EU.

### **Transatlantic relations within NATO**

The panellists also tried to shed light to the state of transatlantic relations within NATO. Chancellor Gerhard Schröder made a speech in February 2005 where he said that some fundamental changes are needed inside NATO, in the relations between the European partners and the USA. The speech provoked much debate on the future role of NATO. What will be the outcome of this speech? Will the European role be strengthened inside the Atlantic Alliance?

During the last few years, especially after the war in Iraq, there have been increasing worries in Europe on the state of transatlantic relations and the future of NATO. It was mentioned that when the US officers give briefings today, the word alliance does not come up very often. Instead one hears the word coalition. Many consider the NRF concept as a test case from the US to the European members of NATO. Unless the European nations reply to this message by improving their military capabilities, the US trend we have seen will continue.

The US will be looking for coalitions of the willing instead of NATO to support them in different operations that emerge.

President Bush's visit to Brussels was obviously a step forward in the relations. The tension has eased a little and the division between the "Old Europe" and "New Europe" is now fading away. According to one panellist, it is likely that the alliance is going to be more coherent in the future. It has to be acknowledged, however, that Europe is totally dependent on the US in that alliance. One panellist considered the European alternative as not very credible, and it is thus very important to keep NATO alive. This requires that the Europeans change their views on some of the issues being dealt with today. The Europeans need to also give credit to the US for the support it has gotten over the years, when Europe has not been able to respond militarily to an emerging crisis. The panellist suspected that the next initiative in NATO will be the restructuring and stabilisation force. This is how the United States tries to reconcile with Europe. The US goes in, does the dirty work, opens the door and Europeans go in as peacekeepers.

#### **The future of the conscript system**

The concept of military transformation has called into question the relevance of the conscript system, which is still in use in many countries. Particularly, there has been speculation about how the conscript system will adapt to the new situation of international assignments and rapid technological development.

According to one panellist, it is quite clear that some northern European countries want to keep the conscript system as the foundation for manning their forces. Those countries are Germany, Denmark, Norway, Finland, Sweden and possibly some others. In general, most European forces are nevertheless moving towards a full volunteer force or professional army. In most countries relying on a conscript system, there are possibilities for conscripts to stay on in the army for a year or two after the basic training. It is necessary to add more volunteer elements to the conscript systems in order to transform the forces. There are two challenges facing conscript systems. First, the necessary equipment in today's army is technologically much more complicated than before and also increasingly expensive. As a result, just to be a combat soldier, the person has to be in the system for a longer period than nine or twelve months. Second, there are increasing pressures for participating in international crisis-management operations. In most countries, the conscripts are not allowed to be sent abroad.

Having admitted the shortfalls of the conscript system, it is however not all that difficult to also defend the system. After all, the way the soldiers are selected and trained matters less than the results one gets. For example, Finland is today one of the highest per capita contributors to international operations. The Finnish system takes the annual class of conscripts and trains them. Some of them might want to continue in the army. The best and the brightest of each class can either be delegated to reserves, or some of them become contract soldiers, some even professional soldiers.

Nevertheless, for a sharper end, more professionalism is needed. It does not necessarily have to be professional soldiers as such; they can be contract soldiers for a few years in service or they can even be reservists who can be specialists of some particular area such as IT. Many IT specialists are needed and they probably would not be satisfied with the pay they would get in the armed forces. From the point of view of the Finnish armed forces, they can stay in the reserves and volunteer for crisis management operations where their expertise can be used. With the conscript system one can do both: you can get enough reserves to defend the country and also recruit enough interested people to do the more demanding tasks in international operations.

The case of Belgium serves as an example of a country that abolished the conscript system, doing so in 1992. There were some lessons learned from that. First, whether you can abolish conscript system depends on the size of the force and the need for reserves, and the country's basic capacity to recruit has to be thoroughly checked. A general rule is that when the economy is doing well, it is difficult to find volunteers for the army. It is therefore necessary to study carefully the possibility to recruit enough volunteers yearly to fill the gap when you abolish conscription. The basic recruitment pool has to be in order. Second, there must be enough time to reduce conscription because the legal base for having the volunteers recruited takes time to prepare.

### **Decision-making inside the organisations and in the member states**

The panel also raised the pertinent question about the decision-making with regard to crisis management. An essential part of rapid deployment forces is indeed a rapid decision-making in both EU and NATO as well as on the national level. The questions of whether decisions can actually be made early enough and who is responsible for making the analysis on whether or not to go in were also raised.

The challenges of decision-making, like most of the other problems related to the rapid deployment forces, have to do with the ability or inability of the member countries to gather the political will to do something. This is something that varies from one crisis to another and has nothing to do with the decision-making machinery itself. One can wonder about whether to undergo an operation in country X, but what is also important is to know that there is machinery to do it quickly if the collective will is there. There is no doubt room for improvement both in NATO and the EU on this particular aspect, too. On a national level the decision can be made very quickly but the actual problem remains in that is there political will in the 25 EU states and in 26 NATO countries to produce the decision to have a military input and take the decision in five days time.

### **Conclusions**

There are two very positive parts in the development of the EUBG and the NRF. One is of course the reason why they are being developed – the need to be swift and rapid in reacting to an uprising crisis. The other part relates to transformation. It seems to be the best possible vehicle for transforming the armed forces in a number of countries. Obviously, tremendous bureaucracy is involved in that change. Even more important is changing mindsets. The National parliaments will be involved in a very different way compared to the norm today, the whole decision-making mechanism will be basically the same but people are going to have to think differently. This will really pinpoint the hard parts associated with transformation issues but there is no other alternative than to deliver.

The security environment in Europe has gone through tremendous changes in the last few years. There is no reason why this development should have to slow down, if the political will exists to carry on with the transformation. It is a process that cannot be reversed. Understanding the word transformation is essential. One possible definition of transformation could be the answer to the question “What can be done?”. What can be done in the current security environment under the current economic conditions? It is all about finding out what can be done.

# SEMINAR PROGRAMME

A Seminar organised by the Atlantic Council of Finland (ACF) and European Security Forum

## DEVELOPING EUROPEAN CRISIS MANAGEMENT CAPABILITIES – Challenges for Finland?

Thursday 28 April 2005

Seminar Agenda

- 09.00      **Welcome Address**  
MP Liisa Jaakonsaari (Soc. Dem.),  
Chair of the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee
- 09.15      **Presentation of the study on the development of  
Rapid Reaction Forces**  
Lieutenant Colonel Juha Pyykönen,  
Director, Department of Strategic Studies,  
National Defence College, Finland
- Session 1: **European Crisis-Management Capabilities**  
Chair: Antti-Juha Pelttari,  
Chairman of the European Security Forum
- 09.35      **NATO Response Force**  
Brigadier Roy Hunstok,  
Chairman, NRF Coordination Group,  
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)
- EU Battlegroups**  
Major General Jean-Pierre Herreweghe,  
Deputy Director General,  
European Union Military Staff (EUMS)
- A Swedish View on EUBGs**  
Major General Michael Moore,  
Assistant Chief, Long Term Plans and Policy,  
Swedish Defence Forces Headquarters
- 10.45-      Coffee  
11.15

Session 2: **Implications for the Participating States**

Chair: Risto E. J. Penttilä,  
Chairman of the Atlantic Council of Finland

11.15 Comment

**“European Crisis Management Capabilities:  
Who Benefits?”**

Hanna Ojanen,  
Senior Researcher,  
Finnish Institute of International Affairs

11.30 **Panel**

Major General Jean-Pierre Herreweghe,  
Deputy Director General,  
European Union Military Staff (EUMS)

Brigadier *Roy Hunstok*,  
Chairman, NRF Coordination Group,  
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)

Michael Moore,  
Assistant Chief, Long Term Plans and Policy,  
Swedish Defence Forces Headquarters

Pauli Järvenpää,  
Director General, Ministry of Defence, Finland

12.45 **Chairman’s Envoy**

## AUTHORS AND CONTRIBUTORS

HERREWEGHE, Jean-Pierre. Major General, Deputy Director General, EU Military Staff.

HUNSTOK, Roy. Brigadier, Chairman Deployable Forces Coordination Group, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE).

JAAKONSAARI, Liisa. Member of the Parliament (Soc. Dem.), Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Parliament, Finland.

JÄRVENPÄÄ, Pauli. Director General, Ministry of Defence, Finland.

MOORE, Michael. Major General, Assistant Chief, Long Term Plans and Policy, Swedish Defence Forces Headquarters.

OJANEN, Hanna. Senior Researcher, Finnish Institute of International Affairs.

PYYKÖNEN, Juha. Lieutenant Colonel, Director, Department of Strategic and Defence Studies, National Defence College, Finland.

The Atlantic Council of Finland was founded in 1999. Its purpose is to promote discussion, research and information on Euro-Atlantic security and defence policy issues in Finland, with a special focus on NATO and the EU. The Council is independent of all political parties.

This publication contains the contributions to the seminar “Developing European Crisis Management Capabilities – Challenges for Finland” held in Helsinki in April 2005. Speakers included i.a. Major General Jean-Pierre Herreweghe and Brigadier Roy Hunstok. Hunstok reflected on the development of the NATO Response Force (NRF) whereas Herreweghe looked at the issue from the EU Battlegroups (EUBG) point of view.

The discussion focused on the development of European crisis management capabilities and its implications especially for small states like Finland and Sweden. It was argued that the main implication for them is the need to transform their armed forces in order to meet the requirements of international operations.